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Abstract
This thesis conducts a close reading of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees’ “Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within
the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees” – a document that explains how legal definitions of refugee status
might take into account gender issues. In it, I investigate the relationship between gender
identity and the refugee status to understand how gender is constructed in relation to
other terms or identity categories that determine whether an individual will be granted
asylum. Performing a close reading of this text, I demonstrate that the UNHCR defines
gender as a ground that may influence or dictate violence. Defining gender in this way,
the text betrays a performative contradiction. On the one hand, the UNHCR treats gender
as a recognizable and distinct identity—one that can be separated from other identity
categories. On the other hand, their inability to articulate clear terms for describing such a
gender identity—to pin down the words with which they might express this bounded
gender—suggests that gender is not a stable, confined, or separable identity category.
This contradiction is significant because it draws our attention to the ways human rights
instruments delineate the language and vocabulary available to people asserting a claim
before the law. That is, the analysis conducted in this thesis demonstrates that there is a
need to pay close attention to how international human rights instruments open and
foreclose an individuals’ ability to account for their experiences and gain a voice in the
law.
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Chapter One - Introduction

The Characteristics of the Refugee: Towards
a Universal Definition
The Second World War left in its wake a refugee crisis that necessitated the creation of
international laws and policies. With over 30 million people left displaced and stateless
(Barnett, 2002: 243), 51 nation-states came together in response to found the United
Nations (UN) in 1945 – an inter-state institution established to prevent a potential third
World War, creating and defining a space for international cooperation and dialogue. The
existence of an intergovernmental platform such as this facilitated the recognition that the
sheer numbers of displaced and fleeing persons required some form of coordinated and
lasting global response (UNHCR, 2005: 5). This, in turn, necessitated the creation of a
uniform standard for determining refugee status and deciding on the basic components of
a claim to asylum. Responding to such concerns, the United Nations member states
adopted the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in July 1951 – an agreement
that remains the core instrument within international asylum law to this day (UNHCR,
2005: 9). This Convention codified both the rights of refugees and the responsibilities of
states, and its adoption marks the establishment of the first permanent framework
concerning refugees on an international scale.
The 1951 Convention outlined for the first time the universal definition of “the refugee”
within international law. It became apparent, however, that this seemingly neutral
definition was, in fact, both written and read with a specific refugee in mind: the male,
European, political dissident, fleeing an oppressive regime in the post-World War II
context (Olivius, 2010: 3; Nyers, 1999: 25). Feminist engagements with refugee law have
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since demonstrated how readings of the refugee definition have excluded the experiences
of women from the scope of the Convention. This thesis, therefore, addresses the need
within the literature to critically engage with the ways “gender” is constructed and read
within documents defining refugee status. With the UNHCR’s 2002 guidelines that
explain how to conduct a gender-inclusive interpretation of the refugee concept as the
point of departure, this thesis therefore sets out to answer the question of how this
guiding document establishes the relationship between gender and the refugee status. I
argue that the Guidelines treats gender as a confined, stable ground from which violence
emerges. However, there is a performative contradiction contained within the very
language of the UNHCR Guidelines, the vocabulary the text employs in discussing and
defining gender conflates various meanings and lived experiences. In other words, the
language of this UNHCR publication itself betrays the ways that gender is not static or
enclosed, but rather a complex, dynamic, and flexible category.
This chapter begins such a study by defining the problem of the relation between gender
and “the refugee” as a legal status. It does so by outlining the historical development of
the Convention, and the scholarly controversy surrounding it. I mainly address the debate
regarding the universal definition of “the refugee,” demonstrating how this concept and
its interpretation have worked to exclude certain groups from the scope of the Convention.
I argue that the existence of a universal definition has produced two exigencies. The first
concerns the power of nation-states vis-à-vis the international community to apply
autonomous understandings of the refugee definition, and the second concerns the way
power may be exercised through acts of interpretation. Establishing the historical context
the Convention and refugee definition was drafted within, and the scholarly debate that
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has followed, will provide contextualization for the review of the literature that follows,
and ultimately situates the rationale and background for my thesis question and research
plan.
1.A. Historical Overview
The adoption of the 1951 Convention on the Status of the Refugee (hereafter the
Convention) marked a watershed moment within the international regime of refugee
protection. Not only did it represent a worldwide will to address the issue of displaced
persons (UNHCR, 2005: 9), the Convention also endorsed one single definition of a
“refugee,” as opposed to earlier instruments that had designated specific groups or
populations as refugees (UNHCR, 2010: 3).1 The first article of the 1951 Convention
holds that a refugee is someone who:
[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic]
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (UNHCR, 2010: 14).
An asylum seeker must in other words be able to establish multiple conditions: he or she
must prove that the experience of fear amounts to persecution and that this fear is wellfounded – that the claimant’s subjective fear is backed up by “sufficient facts to permit
the finding that the applicant faces a serious possibility of persecution” (Goodwin-Gill,
1996: 41). Furthermore, the claimant must prove that this persecution is on account of, or

1

All references to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol, are according to the following document
published by UNHCR: Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (2010). Available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html
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in other words, because of, one or more of the altogether five enumerated grounds for
persecution.2 The emphasis on a refugee as someone “outside the country of his
nationality,” highlights the importance of, and respect for, territorial borders and
sovereignty within this refugee regime, and establishes “the inability of an international
organization to look within a nation’s borders” (Barnett, 2002: 246).
The Convention designated a special role to the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which had been established a year earlier. This
agency was created as the successor of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), and
as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly (UNHCR, 2005: 7). Within the preamble
to the 1951 Convention, the UNHCR is charged with the task of overseeing “the
conventions providing for the protection of refugees”, and it is recognized that “the
effective co-ordination of measures taken to deal with this problem will depend upon the
co-operation of States with the High Commissioner” (UNHCR, 2010: 13). The UNHCR
mandate, which has been expanded from its original formulation, is to “provide, on a
non-political and humanitarian basis, international protection to refugees and to seek
permanent solutions for them” (UNHCR, 2005: 7). The UNHCR is in charge of putting
together international treaties and supervising their application” (Barnett, 2002: 247).
Although the 1951 Convention marked a development towards a universal definition of
the refugee concept, it still delineated clear limitations to its scope. Reflecting the
“reluctance of States to sign a ‘blank cheque’ for unknown numbers of future refugees,”
(Goodwin-Gill, the UN Office of Legal Affairs website), the Convention contained
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The five protected Convention grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group and political opinion.
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temporal and geographical restrictions to the criteria, limiting its application to those who
had become refugees due to events taking place prior to January 1, 1951. Signatory states
were furthermore given the option of limiting their obligations to those displaced because
of events occurring before this time in Europe. This clearly demonstrates that the
Convention was greatly influenced by the post-World War context it was adopted within
(Barnett, 2002: 246), and constructed primarily with a certain type of displaced people in
mind, namely the political refugee fleeing an oppressive state in the post-World War II
context (Olivius, 2010: 3; UNHCR, 2005: 9).
In the time after the establishment of the 1951 Convention, however, the UNHCR was
involved in several events taking place outside of Europe, such as the refugee crises
arising from the Chinese Communist revolution, Decolonization in Africa and Asia
(Johnson, 2011: 1022), and the Algerian war for independence (UNHCR, 2005: 9).
Recognizing that “new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention was adopted
and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of the
Convention” (UNHCR, 2010: 46), a modifying protocol to the Convention was
implemented in 1967. The protocol lifted the temporal and geographical limitations
contained in the refugee definition, making its ambition truly universal in scope.
1.B. The Universal Refugee Concept: Two Exigencies
As the idea of universal human rights was developed in post-war Europe, the
international community sought to extend such rights to fleeing and displaced persons by
delineating the universal rights and conditions of “the refugee.” The characteristics and
entitlements of the refugee, as well as the responsibilities of nation states, were
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subsequently established in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The appearance
of such guiding principles of refugee protection within the landscape of international law
and politics has, however, produced two exigencies. Firstly, the establishment of one
universal refugee concept carries with it implications for the idea of state sovereignty and
the principle of territorial supremacy vis-à-vis the international community. Secondly, the
notion that the refugee concept, as set forth in the Convention, is universal and all
encompassing in scope poses challenges in terms of the room left for interpretation of the
refugee definition. The remainder of this chapter will explore these exigencies and their
components. Drawing on feminist critique of how the “neutral” and “universal”
Convention language in reality was used to favor the male perspective and experience, I
argue that the room left for interpretation within the refugee law created leeway for states
in deciding which refugees to accept and which to exclude, as certain assumptions and
notions in the language could remain unaddressed. This argument highlights the
relationship between language and power, ultimately asserting that the two exigencies of
interpretation and state power are not in fact separate, but rather intertwined dilemmas.
1.B.1. The Space Between Citizenship and Humanity: The Refugee Concept
and State Sovereignty
As the 1951 Convention was established within the context of the newly founded United
Nations, it involved balancing principles of state autonomy on the one side, and interstate cooperation and obligations towards the international community on the other. This
project necessitated the identification of key concepts such as “state sovereignty,”
“independence,” and “non-interference within the reserved domain of domestic
jurisdiction” (Goodwin-Gill, the UN Office of Legal Affairs website). Understanding the
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significance conferred to these concepts helps illuminate certain aspects of the
Convention itself. As the acknowledgment of universal human rights within the domain
of international law was still in its initial phases, the Convention was primarily
understood as an agreement between states regarding the treatment of refugees
(Goodwin-Gill, the UN Office of Legal Affairs website); it was created “first and
foremost in the interests of national and international security, not humanity” (Haddad,
2003:11). This also meant that the Convention was primarily reactive in nature, in that
“the system [was] triggered by a cross-border movement, so that neither prevention, nor
the protection of internally displaced persons come within its range” (Goodwin-Gill, the
UN Office of Legal Affairs website). Refugees were, in this sense, constructed primarily
as a problem of territorial sovereignty, not of humanitarian principles.
This focus on state relations within the refugee regime highlights the way that two
distinct movements were happening at the same time within post-war Europe. While the
atrocities of World War II had led to a growing commitment to universal human rights
upheld by international law, the norms of state sovereignty and citizenship were
simultaneously emphasized as key components in establishing and maintaining a stable
world-order after the war. The paradox of this development is articulated in the following
claim: “[w]hile the first commitment appeals to a common human identity as the basis for
multilateral humanitarian action, the second directs our concern toward maintaining a
world order which insists upon citizenship as the authentic ethico-political identity”
(Nyers, 1999: 3).
The notion of individual rights as understood within post-war Europe was anchored in
belonging to a state, and tied to the ideas of citizenry and national territorial supremacy,
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because “rights only became real when taken up and protected in the positive law of
states” (Haddad, 2003: 3). The citizen was, in turn, the state’s raison d’être (Nyers, 1999:
23), locating the citizen concept at the heart of defining the boundary and identity of the
nation. The refugee definition within international law, however, promises a legal
standing through which individuals gain access to rights and benefits vis-à-vis states in
which he or she is not a member. The refugee concept was therefore situated at the crux
of this contradictory development, and it “brings to the fore the very tension between the
state prerogative to exclude and the human rights imperative to include” (Haddad, 2003:
1). It is in this sense Peter Nyers approaches the “refugee” as a “limit-concept;” in that it
“occupies the ambiguous divide between the binary citizenry/humanity” (1999: 4). The
refugee challenges the orderly appearances of the categories of “citizenship” and
“humanity” because it makes visible the liminal space outside, or beyond, the ontological
and grammatical place that these two categories delineate. The refugee makes visible “the
competing commitments to refugees-as-humans and a world order ideally populated by
citizens” (Nyers, 1999: 4).
In other words, the refugee concept demonstrates limits insofar as it carves out a legal
space that is characterized by state sovereignty citizenry on one side, but simultaneously
by humanitarian norms derived from universal and cosmopolitan principles on the other.
The limit that the refugee concept demarcates is therefore that of “the political,” claims
Nyers (1999: 4), insofar as it demonstrates that the notion of the “proper political
subjectivity” begins and ends with the concept of citizenship (20-21). The right to
political identity and voice vis-à-vis the state, as typically understood, rests in our roles
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and entitlement as citizens, and “[c]onsequently, refugees […] represent a problem not of
geographical, but of political space” (Nyers, 1999: 21).
This emphasis on citizenry, statehood, and rights in post-war Europe meant that a certain
type of refugee became highly visible: the political dissident, fleeing the oppressive
powers of his own state. For the Convention drafters, refugee movements were initially
seen as caused by oppressive states, and thus “the refugee” was essentially someone
deprived of (usually) his political rights (Binder, 2001: 170; Nyers, 1999: 2-3). Thus, a
dichotomy rose between the “proper” political refugee and those with claims based on
other (illegitimate) grounds, such as economic deprivation (Foster, 2007: 1). Alice
Edwards points to a hierarchy of rights within refugee law, which “posits violations of
absolute civil and political rights as the most acceptable (and most serious) basis for
asylum, followed by the derogable list of other civil and political rights, thus leaving
deprivations of economic, social, and cultural rights at the bottom of the hierarchy, with
only exceptional violations of these later rights justifying an asylum claim” (Edwards,
2010: 26). This emphasis on the civil and political as somehow more fundamental to the
human spirit was mirrored in the initial preference given to civil and political rights
within human rights instruments in general, over those of social and economic character,
which where originally thought of as “second generation rights” (Charlesworth, 1994: 58).
This dichotomy between the “political refugee” and the “economic migrant” was,
according to Foster (2007) recast as a gulf between “genuine” and “false” claims to
asylum. This distinction, in turn, grants states the right to deny refugee protection to
applicants they deem unfit, for instance those who “in reality” are “just” economic
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migrants (Foster, 2007: 2-3). Within international law, the prevailing perception was, and
to large degree still is, that “economic refugees” fall outside the scope of international
refugee protection (Foster 2007: 2; Barnett, 2002: 250; Goodwin-Gill, 1996: 3), while
being an issue more relevant, perhaps, to the fields of development and aid (GoodwinGill, 1996: 3). Foster notes, however, that a clear distinction between “economic
migrants” and “authentic refugees” breaks down in practice: “[i]s a Roma man from the
Czech Republic, who suffers extensive discrimination in education and employment, an
‘economic migrant’ or a refugee? What about the street child in the Democratic Republic
of Congo whose government fails to provide him with the basic tools of survival, such as
food or shelter?” (Foster, 2006: 4).
The demarcation between “refugees” and “economic migrants” was further solidified as
the characteristics of the refugee population slowly changed from the 70s onwards, with
increasing numbers of asylum seekers originating from the developing world (Barnett,
2002: 247). This marked the beginning of the refugee regime’s change from an East-West
to a North-South focus (Barnett, 2002: 250). This changing composition of refugees
further complicated the picture as “the line between refugees and migrants began to blur”
(Barnett, 2002: 247). In this context, the differentiation between the “worthy” political
refugees and the “unworthy” economic migrants arguably took on racial undertones, as
states used this distinction to justify the inclusion of some displaced persons and the
exclusions of others; or as Barnett observes: “once the North-South flows began, rather
than recognizing real persecution, receiving nations often labeled such refugees from the
South as economic migrants, a fact which has earned Western governments harsh
criticisms of racism” (Barnett, 2002: 254). The construction of a clear demarcation
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between the economic and the political has, in other words, served as means for
governments to reduce the number of refugees they are responsible for (Hathaway and
Neve, 1997), which in reality means that “Western” states were able to reject “needy”
individuals from the “Global South.” Hathaway and Neve (1997) therefore spoke of what
they saw as a refugee crisis, due to the fact that “[w]hile governments proclaim a
willingness to assist refugees as a matter of political discretion or humanitarian goodwill,
they appear committed to a pattern of defensive strategies designed to avoid international
legal responsibility toward involuntary migrants” (115-16).
The denial of economic depravation as a ground for asylum demonstrates that states have
significant leeway to use their power to decide who is seen as “worthy” of refugee status.
As Barnett notes:
even as UNHCR tries to widen the scope of the refugee regime, states narrow it
again by increasing domestic restrictions. In Western Europe the rate of
recognition of refugees has decreased significantly; in 1983 these countries
recognized 42 per cent of applicants but by 1996 the number had fallen to 16 per
cent (Barnett, 2002: 253).
States, then, have the power to regulate the size and composition of the refugee
population it receives, to a certain degree, despite the “universal” commitments and goals
outlined by the international community.
1.B.2. Reading law: Power and interpretation
The ways in which the political and the economic refugee are made into the genuine and
the bogus asylum seeker alerts us to the real power that is embedded within the reading
and interpretation of refugee law. The point that nation-states maintain a certain
autonomy through employing restrictive interpretations of the refugee definition, leads to
the second exigency borne from the introduction of the 1951 Convention; namely that of
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the ambiguity of the refugee definition itself and the terms under which refugee status
might be granted. The problem of the confusion between economic and political grounds
for asylum can be seen an issue of interpretation, in this case of the concept of
“persecution” and whether it covers economic deprivation. Despite being a key concept
to the Convention, there is no exact definition of what constitutes “persecution,” neither
in the Convention itself, nor in any of the other international instruments of refugee
protection (Goodwin-Gill, 1996: 66). The same is true for the five enumerated grounds
for persecution, and there has been much debate on the true meaning of concepts such as
“particular social group,” or “political opinion.” This leaves, as demonstrated above,
room for governments and institutions involved in determining refugee status to interpret
how the refugee definition should be applied in each case (Goodwin-Gill, 1996: 67).
Interpretive differences, therefore, have potentially massive impacts “on the ground,” as
definitions of key terms may work to exclude different groups from the scope of the law.
In the example of the racialized exclusion of economic refugees, for instance, it has been
noted that the problem does not arise from the refugee law itself, but rather from the
interpretation of that law (Barnett, 2002: 254).
The types of persons and experiences are seen to fall under the scope of the refugee
Convention, then, depends on the ways that one reads the refugee definition and its
components. It is in this sense that the problem of forced migration and asylum within the
international domain can be understood as politics of perception (Barnett, 2002: 255):
with a refugee concept that allows for various interpretations, those understandings that
are seen as authoritative enable the perception and visibility of some refugees, while
others are rendered invisible. As the refugee term was initially read and interpreted within
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the post-war European context, the norms and perceptions of that era and continent
shaped the ways in which both the dilemma of forced displacement and the language of
the 1951 Convention was interpreted. An individualistic conception of persecution
(Goodwin-Gill, 1995: 8), and the privileging of the political asylum (Binder, 2001: 170),
informed a certain understanding of what it meant to be a refugee, which worked to
delegitimize experiences that did not conform to this idea. Anjana Bahl argues that the
interpretation of the refugee definition “operates against the claims of refugees from the
Third World who may not be fleeing their countries because they are deprived of their
individual rights, but rather are fleeing social violence or general policies that affect large
sections of their society” (1997: 36, footnote 23). Refugee movements caused for
instance by “economic disasters” or the “break down of state machinery” (Edwards,
2010: 30) may similarly fall outside interpretations of the Convention definition.

While the Convention used a language of “universality” and “objectivity,” the geopolitical context it was constructed within meant that it was the European perceptions of
the “neutral” and the “normal” that prevailed and that subsequently was being read into
such categories. There was therefore a tension between the language and ambition of
universality, and the way that this language was in fact interpreted and applied so that a
“Western” point of view was furthered, in turn influenced by specific economic and
ideological assumptions (Barnett, 2002: 249). The problem arises, in other words,
because the ambiguity of the refugee definition allows certain presumptions and
prejudices to go unaddressed. The international regime of human rights, and the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in particular, assumed a certain “Universal Man,”
(Palmary, 2008: 129) without realizing that this subject was being interpreted and
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understood within a “Western” framework.

This “Universal Man” of human rights in general, and refugee law in particular, was not
only essentially a European figure – he was also an inherently male figure. At its
adoption in 1951, not a single woman was present at the Geneva conference where the
refugee Convention was drafted (Edwards, 2010: 23), and ultimately, neither the
Convention nor the Protocol incorporates sex or gender either as grounds for persecution,
or as prohibited bases of discrimination.3 The question of gender-related persecution
came up only once, and it was decided that asylum claims arising from persecution on
account of sex was unlikely to occur (Edwards, 2010: 22-23). Although the majority of
the refugees were (Chan, 2011: 177) and still are female, women typically lack the
financial means, resources, and freedom to leave their country of origin, and the
international community was therefore, at the time the Convention was adopted, faced
with a population of asylum-seekers who were predominately male (Chan, 2011: 177). In
addition, the majority of adjudicators responsible for interpreting the law and deciding on
refugee status were, then as now, male (Bosi, 2004: 795). These circumstances
contributed to the fact that within all aspects of the refugee regime, it was the male
perspective that became the norm: “from the process of defining a refugee to the final
phase of resettlement, both the overall discourse, practice, and research concerning
refugees […] remains primarily a male paradigm, even if in a superficial way it appears
to be a universal and general one” (Indra, 1987: 2).

3

For instance, article 3 of the 1951 Convention, on Non-Discrimination, reads that: “The Contracting
States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion
or country of origin.”
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The refugee was from the beginning imagined and envisioned as male (Indra, 1987: 3),
more specifically, as “someone heroically seeking to assert his (typically male)
individuality against an oppressive state” (Nyers, 1999: 25); or as a “male dissident
fleeing political persecution behind the iron curtain” (Olivius, 2010: 3). The power of
such cultural images are, as Indra notes, significant because “public images constitute one
of the most profound constraints on social action, for through the power to form societal
images and symbols comes the power to set the stage for formal responses to social
issues” (Indra, 1987: 3). The same way that the ambiguity of the Convention language
allowed interpretations of the term “persecution” that excluded the experiences of
displacement in the “Global South,” the interpretive exclusion of economic and social
claims also contributes to the disadvantage of women. The devaluation of social and
economic forms of harm “play[s] into a gendered refugee discourse, by disadvantaging
women claimants who are more likely to be adversely affected by poverty and social and
cultural marginalization than by direct political targeting” (Edwards, 2010: 26). This
means that forms of harm specific to women, such as female genital cutting (FGC), rape,
or domestic abuse may be understood as falling outside the definition of “persecution”
(Fletcher, 2006: 112-113). Women also frequently fail the “nexus test,” or the
requirement to establish a connection between the enumerated Convention grounds and
the motive for persecution – the link that corresponds to the “for reasons of” part of the
definition, so to speak – as it is understood within gender-biased interpretations of the
refugee definition. Because women’s persecutors more frequently involve non-state
actors, the link between the persecution and the Convention ground is increasingly
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difficult to establish, as there rarely any exists documentation of the perpetrator’s motive
in such cases (Fletcher, 2006: 113).
An androcentric reading of the refugee law therefore worked to exclude women in a
number of ways. Applications of the law frequently ignored that men and women might
experience each of the five nexuses – race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion – differently. A narrow understanding of the
term “political opinion,” for instance, might only recognize as “political” those acts and
domains that are predominately male, and perceived as “public.” At the same time,
interpretations of the other aspects of the refugee definition, such as the “persecution”
term and the nexus requirement, meant that women-specific forms of harm were seen as
falling outside the scope of the refugee protection regime. The consequence has been that
women’s claims to refugee status have long been delegitimized (Edwards, 2010: 23), and
forms of persecution specific to women, such as sexual violence, are only now being
recognized as such (Neacsu, 2003: 193). It is therefore, ironically, the very genderneutral formulations and ambition of the refugee Convention that rendered women
invisible. This leads one scholar to hypothesize whether, at the time the Convention was
drafted, “a choice of a gender-sensitive formula instead of gender-neutral terms may have
prevented the unsettled and unpredictable case law that has followed” (Binder, 2001: 7-8).
With the growing importance of feminist thought throughout the 60s and 70s, and
impelled by the United Nations World Conferences on Women in 1975, 1980 and 1985
(Olivius, 2010: 3), the Convention text was increasingly read through a gender sensitive
lens. In their critique of the presumed legal subject of refugee law as male, scholars and
activists also began to question the heteronormativity with which the refugee subject was
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constructed. During the 80s and 90s, key receiving nations, such as Germany and the
U.S., began to accept that homosexuals might form a “particular social group,” whereas
the U.K. acknowledged this stance as late as in 1999 (Millibank, 2003: 71-72). Within
this development, it became increasingly apparent how the refugee categories were
frequently interpreted in ways that excluded the experiences of homosexuals and
bisexuals. One example is the category of “political opinion,” where homosexuals, much
in the same way as women, struggle to have their experiences recognized as such.
Millibank (2003) writes that despite most of the applicants not necessarily being
“politically active around sexuality issues,” it is the way that their sexuality is perceived
as a threat to “the state, the family, or the natural order” that often put them at risk (106).
“Sexuality [is], in that sense, a political experience, but this is not the sense in which
political opinion is traditionally understood in refugee law. It is remarkable that sexuality
claims are rarely articulated, and almost never received, as political claims” (106-107).
Also when it comes to the “particular social group” nexus, homosexuals, and in particular
bisexuals, face barriers in terms of the ways sexuality is linked to questions of choice.
Judiciaries are found to frequently lean on essentialist conceptions of sexual identity as
immutable and innate (Rehaag, 2008: 61), instead of fluid and complex, and are thus only
willing to accept the claims of those who appear unable to “choose” their sexual
orientation. Thus, writes Millibank, “[r]efugee protection routinely attaches to sexuality
only where it is or where is it perceived as a result of necessity and not choice” (2003:
92.) She explains:
You are protected because you cannot help being gay, and cannot help being
persecuted for being gay because you cannot help expressing your gayness
somehow. In situations where the applicant was seen as having some choice, or
their sexuality in any way fluid or temporary – if they could be seen as bisexual,
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young, sexually inexperienced generally, or having had only limited same-sex
sexual experiences, the Australian tribunal, in particular, was very reluctant to
accept them as actually gay and therefore eligible under the social group category
(Millibank, 2003: 92-93, footnotes omitted).
Assumptions about what lesbians or gay men, and their lifestyles, look like may lead
adjudicators to dismiss the stories of individuals who do not conform to this stereotype
(Rehaag, 2008: 71-72; Millibank, 2002: 177). This shows that heterosexuality is very
much taken as the norm; the standard against which other forms of sexuality is measured
and judged. Individual presumptions on the part of decision-makers about what it means
to be “gay” affects the ways he or she interprets and applies the refugee category: “[t]he
decision-makers’ understanding of what (homo)sexuality is and how it is and ought to be
expressed is therefore vital in the decision making process,” writes Millibank (2002: 145).
1.C. Concluding Remarks
What this introductory chapter has demonstrated is that the establishment of the universal
definition of the “refugee” carried with it two exigencies, one related to the power of
states in vis-à-vis the international community, and one to the power of language and
interpretation. In short, the first exigency stems from the tension arising from the
existence of international refugee law, between universal and international principles on
the one side, and domestic state authority on the other. While nation-states are bound by
international principles and laws, they are nonetheless able to exercise power through the
ways in which these laws and principles are transferred to, and applied within, the
domestic context. The second exigency concerns the ambiguity of the language with
which the refugee definition is formulated. This ambiguity enables certain assumptions
and prejudices to be presented as “neutral” within authoritative interpretations of the law,
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and therefore remain unaddressed. More specifically, because the refugee definition was
originally drafted and interpreted with the popular image of the male, European,
heterosexual refugee fleeing political persecution in mind, other experiences of
persecution and harm were rendered invisible and outside the scope of the Convention.
What the feminist critique of the refugee law has demonstrated, then, is that these two
exigencies are not, in fact, different problems that can be separated and analyzed on their
own, but rather two intertwined issues. Because of the ways that power may be exercised
through the act of interpreting text, nation-states retain much authority vis-à-vis the
international community in deciding how the refugee definition should be understood,
and thus, which individuals qualify for the refugee standing that entitles them to
protection. The insight offered by feminist readings of the law is therefore that a
significant part of the challenges female asylum seekers face are in fact located in the
fields of language and interpretation, because the refugee law tends to be read both
within a male-centered framework, and by men. Because it historically was, and
continues to be, women who have their specific experiences excluded from authoritative
readings of the refugee definition, it remains an important practice to analyze the ways
that the refugee definition is interpreted and understood, and how the categories of
“gender” or “women” are understood within these interpretations.
The ways in which states and decision-makers may apply understandings of key concepts
and terms within universal laws – which in turn allows them to regulate which
individuals are included as “legitimate” refugees and which are excluded from this legal
standing – represents a very real and important problem for scholars of international
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relations. Despite increasing sensitivity to gender issues, interpretations of the refugee
definition continue to differ between and within states, and Courts keep making
irreconcilable decisions in asylum claims. A 2004 study of 41 European states show, for
instance, that
less than half had recognized sexual violence as a form of persecution (41.5 per
cent); over a third of countries (33 per cent) do not accept persecution at the hands
of non-state actors as falling within the definition of a refugee in the 1951
Convention; and nearly two-thirds of countries do not acknowledge failure to
conform to social and cultural mores as a basis for a claim to asylum (61 per cent).
Moreover, just over one-third of countries had recognized women or particular
women as members of [particular social groups] PSG (36.5 per cent). Likewise,
jurisprudence in the United States has been at best muddled (Edwards, 2010: 30).
What is at stake here is in a sense the very nature and ambition of human rights and
international law, which seeks to extend to all individuals the same rights and protection.
The problem of the refugee concept points to certain issues at the very heart of
international law in general, which has the contradictory task to draft universal standards
and formulations, while simultaneously remaining relevant and inclusive of all
individuals - across cultures, classes, genders and so forth. Edwards describes “the value
of international human rights law as a common language reflecting universal values, and
as a shared legal system that articulates basic standards of a life with dignity,” (2011: xii).
Yet the feminist critique asserted by her and others highlight the fundamental importance
of analyzing and questioning this “common language” of universal values, and the
concepts and definitions that may be taken for granted within it.
In the next chapter, I investigate this broader scholarly conversation about gender within
the international refugee regime, and the ways that gender is constructed and presented as
a category within it. I address not only the feminist critique of the Convention, but also
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the differing approaches between feminist scholars as to how gender can and should be
reconciled within refugee law. Thus, I try to show the multifaceted and diverse nature of
the feminist conversation. I also seek to make the point that there is no simple process of
“discovering” and subsequently including women within the refugee definition. What this
inclusion should look like and how it should happen continue to be contested questions,
and Courts continue to treat gender-related issues in irreconcilable ways. From this
overview of feminist engagement with the “problem” of gender within refugee law, I then
situate my own question about the relationship between gender and the refugee definition
as it is constructed, and set up a research plan for the analysis to come.
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Chapter Two – Literature Review

Accounting for Gender:
Feminist Engagement with Refugee Law
In the previous chapter I outlined the exigencies brought forth by the introduction of a
universal definition of refugee status, to illuminate the power embedded in interpretation
and representation within international law. Using feminist critique of the refugee
Convention, I argued that the silencing of women’s points of view could be reframed as a
question of language and interpretation; or the terms with which one is able represents
oneself to the law. The literature review further examines the complexities of this
problem by exploring the controversy presented in and through scholarly literature. I
primarily focus the literature review on feminist engagements with international law,
paying particular attention to how feminist scholars address refugee law. Specifically, I
investigate how feminist approaches construct and theorize gender as a category of law
and policy. Within this focus, the literature outlined in this chapter centers on questions
of inclusion and exclusion of gender within international law and policy, and on the
question of how the legal category “women” is, and should be, “read.”
I organize this chapter around three separate, but related, questions. Firstly, I start more
broadly by looking at literature on how, to borrow Olivius’ words, “gender inequality has
been constructed and reconstructed as a policy problem within the UNHCR” (2010: 2), as
well as within international institutions, policies and programs generally. The question
central to this debate is “whether women's rights are best protected through general
norms or through specific norms applicable only to women,” a dilemma Olympe de
Gouges identified as early as the eighteenth century as a paradox of feminism
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(Charlesworth, 2005: 1). This section looks closer at strategies of including women
within both feminist debate and UNHCR policy, from the initial addition of women’s
concerns within separate programs, policies, and institutions, to the diffusion of a gender
focus through “gender mainstreaming.” The second question around which I organize this
literature review is how gender is discursively constructed and represented as a category
within the language and ideologies of the international refugee regime. I look closer at
how the idea of a gendered binary between “private” and “public” spheres and acts has
worked to exclude women’s experiences of harm from the protection of the refugee
Convention. I address the representation of masculinity and femininity within refugee law
and policy, and how these concepts intersect with those of race, and sexual orientation.
Lastly, the literature review turns to the more specific conversation about the language of
the refugee Convention, and the issue of how the refugee definition should or can be
amended in order to rectify the gender deficiency. I organize this section around the
question of whether women’s experiences are best included through gender-sensitive
interpretation of the existing definition, or by modifying the language of the Convention
by adding “gender” as a sixth enumerated ground for persecution. I look closer at the
rationale and arguments presented by proponents of each of these positions.
The literature reviewed in this thesis is significant, I argue, because it invites a study of
texts that address the relationship between refugee status and gender. In the final section
of this chapter, then, I define and justify the question that will be the centerpiece of this
thesis. Based on this overview of the feminist engagement with gender within refugee
law, I contextualize the rationale for the study to be carried out, and introduce the text
that makes up the material for the main analysis, the 2002 UNHCR “Gender-Related
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Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” situating this text within the larger
conversation it is a part of.
2.A. Including Women: From “Sidestreaming” to “Mainstreaming” of Gender
The reading of international law through a gender-lens has revealed much about how
gender is constructed and represented within seemingly “neutral” policy. As Olivius
(2010) points out, “[d]efining political problems is never a neutral activity; how a
problem is constructed determines the boundaries of different social categories; which
categories are cast as vulnerable, needy, or in positions of privilege. Different problem
constructions constitute different relations of power” (4). Investigating how the
international community constructs the problem of forced displacement, and thus shapes
what policy and legal responses that are seen as appropriate, will therefore reveal how
gender is constructed as a category and subject of knowledge. Edwards (2011)
demonstrates that the feminist critique of international human rights law can be divided
into four major themes or categories (Edwards, 2011). Her organization of scholarship on
gender and human rights into a few main categories, or themes, helps structure the
literature overview in the following section, and demonstrates both the similarities and
differences between the various approaches within the literature. The first category of
critique focuses on the absence of women and women’s voices throughout the human
rights field; the second addresses the ways in which the male experience is privileged and
constructed as the norm, whereas the realities of women’s lives are discounted and
marginalized; the third directs attention to the dichotomy between private and public
spheres, in which the private/female is seen as subordinate to the public/male; and the last
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set of criticism focuses on the ways in which women have been treated and
conceptualized as a homogenous group “with a single gender identity” (Edwards, 2011:
37). These different nodes around which feminist criticism centers are parallel to the
ways feminist approaches has developed over time, from a focus on women as a specific
group with special needs, through gender mainstreaming and later modifications such as
“age, gender and diversity mainstreaming” (Edwards, 2010: 22).
The initial critique of international law and policy from a gender perspective focus on the
absence of women’s points of view from such documents and programs. In the early 70s,
Esther Boserup and other feminist scholars changed the conversation about development
programs by arguing that these projects were biased towards men. Boserup’s main
criticism was that women were excluded and neglected within development projects,
which on the outset appeared “gender neutral,” but in reality focused on providing aid
and modernization to men (Boserup, 2001: 40). Development practitioners and
researchers argued that major institutions, such as the UN, were male-biased, “resulting
in women being ignored and/or disadvantaged by the development process” (Koczberski,
1998: 396). This criticism sparked much debate on the relevance of gender within the
field of development and its institutions, a question central to what is now known as the
Women in Development (WID) model. WID scholars and practitioners seek to ensure
that also “Third World” women receive what is seen as the benefits of modernization.
The WID strategy thus focuses on “integrating” women into the scope of the
development process, while increasing their participation within formal economic and
political structures (Koczberski, 1998: 399). Within the WID framework, then,
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“integration” mean, in the words of Koczberski, that “women would be incorporated into
existing development practice under orthodox notions of development” (1998: 396).
Spurred on by this focus on women within development and aid, the UN Decade for
women (1975-1985), and the UN World Conferences on Women, feminist scholars and
activists extended the criticism to the field of refugee protection (Olivius, 2010: 3). A
transnational movement for the rights of refugee women grew throughout the 80s,
(Olivius, 2010: 3), calling for the equal inclusion of women within the scope of refugee
protection. Gender had been “discovered” within the refugee regime – and subsequently
constructed as a subject of knowledge – which gave rise to questions about how women
and men might experience flight and exile differently, and how gender should be taken
into account to improve refugee protection. Such inquiries lead to the creation of new
field manuals, training programs, and policy documents such as the 1989 UNHCR Policy
on Refugee Women (Olivius, 2010: 3), in which women’s concerns were added to the
(otherwise unchanged) refugee programs. In 1985, the Executive Committee of the
UNHCR’s Programme (EXCOM) – the governing body of the UNHCR – established that
“women asylum seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having
transgressed the social mores of the society” fell within the interpretation of the refugee
definition, although it was left up to the sovereign nation-states to choose whether or not
to do so (Edwards, 2010: 24).
The initial feminist critique of the refugee protection regime, in other words, constructs
gender inequality as a problem that is ameliorated through adding specific women’s
programs and policies to existing structures – a so-called “add-women-and-stir” approach

27
(Olivius, 2010: 7). Seeking to “integrate women into the development process of
becoming more western and more modern,” however, “WID never challenged the
dominant modernization paradigm, or the idea of essential femininity and masculinity”
(Olivius, 2010: 7). That is, early feminist criticism focused on the exclusion of women
from development structures, without challenging the ways that the structures themselves
were biased (Charlesworth, 2005: 2). Women were treated as a separate group in need of
“particular accommodation,” and initial policy responses were criticized for resulting in
the “compartmentalization” (Charlesworth, 1994: 63), or “ghettoization,” of the concerns
of women, relegating them to peripheral “sidestream” projects (Edwards, 2010: 307-308).
Since the overarching framework was left unchallenged, the male experience and point of
view continued to be the norm, while women’s concerns were represented as the
exception to, or deviation from, this male standard. A further concern is that the
compartmentalization of women’s concerns into separate institutions means that they
must compete with the mainstream programs and policies for finances and resources.
This has resulted in women-specific programs generally enjoying less power, priority,
and resources than the mainstream ones (Charlesworth, 2005: 1).
The “adding on” approach to the relationship between gender and the refugee status was
challenged by scholars claiming that gender should be viewed as “an organizing principle,
not a simple variable,” within migration and refugee movements (Fitzpatrick, 1997: 24),
and that “the protection of women and girls is ‘a core activity’ and ‘an organizational
priority’” (Edwards, 2010: 32). Doreen Indra (1987) pointed to the tendency of decisionmakers involved in refugee determination to view people as “refugees first and women or
men second” (4) – which relegates gender-identities and gender-concerns to secondary
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status – and pointed out the necessity in placing gender “at the centre of the analysis” (4).
Out of such criticism grew a different approach termed “gender mainstreaming.” This
strategy seeks not to separate, but to integrate, women’s concerns “within every corner of
the humanitarian and human rights system” (Edwards, 2010: 35). Acknowledging that
seemingly gender-neutral policies may affect women and men differently, this approach
seeks to assess “the implications for women and men of any planned action, including
legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels” (UN General Assembly,
1997: 27). Although many women-specific policies were continued, the UNHCR
incorporated strategies of gender mainstreaming, developing what was called their “twopronged approach” of combining specific programs aimed at refugee women with a focus
on integrating their concerns into the “mainstream” projects (Edwards, 2010: 35).
“Gender”, for instance, replaced “refugee women” as focal points within UNHCR
policies (Edwards, 2010: 37). Aiming to establishing an inclusive refugee regime, the
gender mainstreaming strategy after a while developed into an “age, gender and diversity
mainstreaming” (AGDM) approach, as new social groups were added as focal points
(Edwards, 2010: 38).
The gender mainstreaming strategy has, however, been criticized for achieving the
opposite of its intentions. Edwards argues that “the […] consequence of working within
the mainstream is the reality that being held to the same standards as men de jure results
in women’s subjection to additional (and therefore unequal) legal burdens de facto.
Female litigants must ‘fit’ their experiences of violence into male-defined criteria” (2011:
106). Another point has been that the strategy loses its “critical edge” by “allow[ing] the
mainstream to tame and deradicalize claims to equality,” and by making issues of gender
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inequality “harder to identify and to deal with” – in effect “drowning out” the project of
gender equality (Charlesworth, 2005: 2). When a focus on the exclusion of women is
merely “blended” with concerns for all refugees generally, the emphasis on inequality
and power imbalances between men and women may be lost. Edwards further adds that
the strategy is problematic in its conflation of the two concepts “sex” and “gender,” and
in its failure to address the roots of sexual inequality (2010: 36). In the words of Edwards,
gender mainstreaming has in some ways “become a neutralising [sic] philosophy, rather
than an empowering one for refugee women” (Edwards, 2010: 37), and she asks:
“[w]hose interests will be prioritized, if all interests are equal? Will such a strategy be
meaningful if it includes everyone in equal measure, almost regardless of disadvantage,
patriarchy, or hierarchy?” (Edwards, 2010: 39).
A final approach to how gender should be understood and incorporated within policy,
which in some ways overlaps with the insight of the AGDM strategy (Edwards, 2010: 39),
is intersectionality theory. Although more broadly applicable as a general theory of
gender and identity, the approach of intersectionality is of particular interests in terms of
how gender should be thought of within policy. The intersectionality approach focuses on
the “multiple forms of discrimination which affect women’s lives” (Edwards, 2010: 39),
an approach in which gender is not seen as the only organizing (hierarchical) principle
within the lives of women (or men, for that matter). Yuval-Davis explains how
intersectionality theory focuses on the inter-relationships between various “social
divisions,” (2006: 194) such as gender, class, sexual orientation, race, and physical
ability. Intersectionality refers to how such categories constitute axes of identity that
intersect and combine in creating unique experiences and identities. This insight is a
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criticism of reductionist and essentialist conceptualization of various categories as being
inherently tied to certain traits and characteristics. Whereas the initial WID response was
additive in that it sought to “add” the experiences of the singular group “women” to
existing institutions and programs, intersectionality is constitutive; social divisions are
not simply added to one another in constituting identities (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 195), but
rather combined to make unique experiences. Social categories are seen as changeable
and dynamic, and they cannot be separated and analyzed “outside” of each other.
International theorists argue, then, that policy and institutions should incorporate more
nuanced understanding of gender, and depart from seeing “women” as a pre-existing
entity or group of inherently oppressed individuals.
2.B. (Re)presenting Gender: Producing Femininities and Masculinities
As this brief overview of feminist engagement with refugee policies, laws, and programs
has demonstrated, “gender” is far from a natural, given concept that can easily be
incorporated into policy and law. Ideas of gender both underpin, and are produced within,
the policies and practices of the UNHCR and other refugee institutions (Olivius, 2010: 5).
This following section, therefore, looks closer at various attempts to understand and
represent “gender” within the field of international refugee protection. One such gendered
assumption is the idea of the (gendered and Western) dichotomy between “public” and
“private” spheres (Millibank, 2002: 157). Criticism of the constructed public/private
binary – in and through which women’s activities are relegated to the undervalued private
sphere, and men’s to the privileged public – is at the heart of much feminist criticism.
As this section demonstrates, this inherently gendered notion of the private and the public
affects the reading of all aspects of the refugee definition; from what harms are codified
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as “persecution” and the locations where such harms are thought to take place, to the
understanding of what constitutes a “political opinion” as a ground for persecution, and
who the agents of persecution are.
Interpretations of the refugee Convention have, to begin with, typically privileged
“persecution occurring within the (usually male dominated) ‘public’ sphere,” while “deemphasising” or “disregarding the legitimacy of persecution arising from activities which
are considered somehow ‘private’” (Nyers, 1999: 7). Interpretations of the term
“persecution,” have in other words granted this status to the acts and forms of harm that
are seen as taking place in specific (public) places, and involving specific actors and
motives: “the accepted understanding under international law of ‘persecution’ remained
mostly confined to instances of torture and inhuman treatment carried out against
political dissidents by public authorities in state custody, and not to victims of rape that
took place in their homes” (Edwards, 2011: x). An individual who experiences
persecution based on his political opinion is thus seen as deserving of refugee status and
protection, whereas someone who experiences systematic domestic abuse is thought of
outside international refugee law. At the conference where the 1951 Convention was
drafted, it was for instance, altogether decided that “the equality of the sexes was a matter
for national legislation” (Edwards, 2010: 23). States have thus had much leeway within
the refugee language to disregard the disadvantages usually suffered by women,
dismissing them as “private matters” outside the scope of international law (Bahl, 1997:
35). Persecution in the forms of rape, domestic abuse, female genital cutting, and
trafficking are amongst forms of persecutions that are only recently beginning to be
recognized as such (Neacsu, 2003: 193).
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This conceptualization of private versus public is also significant in terms of interpreting
the enumerated grounds for persecution, in particular “political opinion.” This term has
generally been understood within refugee law as “opinions contrary to or critical of the
policies of the government or ruling party” (Edwards, 2003: 68), a definition that reflects
a certain taken-for-granted association between the “political” and those acts and spheres
that involves the state machinery. Or put another way, the silence of women within the
refugee regime is partly “compounded by an unconscious calculus that assigns the critical
quality "political" to many public activities but few private ones” (Indra, 1987: 3). The
labeling of women’s experiences as “private” and “non-political” both denies them any
systematic or societal meanings and importance, and sends the message that gendered
violence is “[women’s] problem, that they are to blame for it, and that they are alone in
resolving it” (Edwards, 2011: 318). The inherently gendered interpretations of the
refugee experience, as coded in a language of “private” or “public,” make it difficult for
decision-makers to recognize women as deserving of refugee protection. As Edwards
asks:
Why is it so difficult to recognize the acts of a woman in transgressing social
customs as political? (…) Why are young girls who refuse to undergo female
genital mutilation not political dissidents, breaking one of the fundamental
customs of their society? (2003: 68 – footnotes omitted)
The ways in which the “public” and the “private” are coded as gendered becomes
particularly apparent in asylum claims based on sexual orientation, where Millibank finds
“stark gender differences in the experiences of lesbians and gay men and the subsequent
translation of these experiences into legal categories” (2002: 157). While the violence
lesbians face is generally codified as happening in the “private” spheres, such as within
the home and the family, violence against homosexual men is thought of as happening in
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the “public,” for instance in parks or areas around gay bars and clubs (Rehaag, 2008: 73).
This assigning of the labels “public” and “private” to the harms experienced by gay men
and lesbians respectively, constructs different barriers for men and women who seek
asylum on the grounds of sexual orientation. While male claimants are often rejected
because their sexuality is seen as “too public,” i.e. that they knowingly “flaunt” their
sexuality and thereby transgress social mores, lesbian claimants are frequently rejected
because the violence against them is seen as a private matter, “too private” to fall within
the scope of international law (Rehaag, 2008: 73; Millibank, 2002: 157).
The privileging of the public lastly becomes evident in the way the refugee convention
conceptualizes the agents of persecution. Within human rights law in general, the focus is
on state responsibility (Edwards, 2011: 37), while the refugee definition was constructed
with state persecution in mind. When direct state involvement becomes prerequisite for
recognizing an act as persecution, the outcome is gendered. While women are frequently
victims of state-sanctioned abuse and persecution at the hands of state officials, (Schenk,
1994: 304), women are also the predominant targets of certain forms of harm that are
labeled “intimate” or “private,” such as such as for instance domestic abuse, FGC, forced
marriage, or “honor” killings. In such instances, their persecutor may not be a state
official, but rather family or community members (Schenk, 1994: 306). Because certain
forms of harm are codified as “private” or “personal,” and somehow disconnected from
public life and the society at large, they have long been excluded from the refugee
definition. Gendered assumptions about “public” and “private” spheres, and the “proper”
arenas for the feminine and the masculine, have in other words had great implications for
asylum-seekers “on the ground.” This illustrates that taken-for-granted notions of
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categories and stereotypes shape the reading of law, and in turn, become reproduced
through it. It is therefore important to investigate closer how notions of femininity and
masculinity, and the associated power relations, become (re)produced within the
institutions, practices and language of global governance (Olivius, 2010: 4).
In order to address these topics, the works of Michel Foucault on discourses and power
make a helpful backdrop. For Foucault, discourse can be seen as the structured ways in
which we think and talk about things (1972: 76). Within discourse, we use and construct
categories and labels attached to certain groups, such as for instance “women,”
“homosexuals,” or “refugees,” and Foucault was interested in how power operates
through the way we represent, categorize, and in general speak about such groups. A key
point here is that discourses does not merely use or identify such categories, they also
“form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1972: 49). In the words of Olivius,
“discourses are practises [sic] which delimit what can be said, thought or done; when,
how and by whom. Discourses set the limits for what is perceived as possible, reasonable
or natural” (2010: 5).
The works of Foucault became highly influential during the 70s and 80s, and with the
new insight and perspectives, feminist criticism took up the question of how women were
represented within the international refugee regime. The argument, generally stated, was
that the policy discourse contributed to a victimization of refugee women, by
constructing the female refugee as weak and vulnerable through “protective discourses,”
which “often depicted women collectively as ‘vulnerable’ and in need of protection”
(Edwards, 2010: 32). In analyzing the representation of refugees within the UNHCR,
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Johnson (2011) argues that the collective imagination of the refugee has gone through
three overlapping and concurrent shifts: from racialization, through victimization, and
feminization (1016). In other words, the “heroic, political individual” fleeing the
oppressive state as the central visualization during the cold war era was gradually
replaced by the image of a “nameless flood of poverty-stricken women and children”
(1016). In this process, and as the refugee concept becomes racialized and feminized, the
refugee is also deprived of the (political) agency that was at the center of the post-war
refugee concept. It is significant, as Johnson points out, that “as the refugee has been
racialised and victimised, she has also been feminised” [sic] (Johnson, 2011: 1016).
Interestingly, Fitzpatrick (1997) notes that “adjudicators are more receptive to arguments
premised on the physical vulnerability of women (for example, to the risk of female
genital mutilation) than to the enhanced dangers women face as a result of prescribed
social roles or gender-based constraints on mobility” (44). This might show that
stereotypical notions of what it means to be a woman shapes legal practice, and how
policy approaches are built on different understandings of gender as a category.
One way the essentialist and protective discourse on women as refugees has played out,
is through the “womenandchildren” approach, in which the phrase “women and children”
is used so often that the distinction between the two collapses (Johnson, 2011: 1032).
This in turn infantilizes a woman by implying that she, like a child, is in need of
protection. It thus serves to portray women as passive subjects who need to be saved,
inherently “dependent upon their male counterparts for survival and salvation” (Johnson,
2011: 1032). It furthermore reaffirms men as the normal, while women are depicted
primarily in and through their roles as mothers or family members (Johnson, 2011: 1032).
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As late as 2002, notes Edwards, the UNHCR included the goal to “[meet] the protection
needs of refugee women and refugee children” in its Agenda for Protection (Edwards,
2010: 32). “This conflation of ‘women and children’ in UN documentation as late as
2002” notes Edwards, “harks back to earlier days in which women and children were
consistently treated as one and the same” (2010: 32).
Criticism, however, was also directed towards how “women” has been constructed as a
category of analysis within feminist works. Mohanty (1984) argues that within Western
scholarship on development and aid, the discourse of empowerment is both gendered and
racialized. She argues that “Third World Women,” in particular, are constituted as a
singular, homogenous group, bound together by their shared status as oppressed and
disadvantaged (1984: 56). They are labeled “powerless,” “exploited,” and “sexually
harassed,” paralleling sexist discourse that frames women as weak and emotional (56). In
writing on the emergence of the WID framework, Koczberski similarly argues that
“Third World women have been presented in a particular way, with their problems and
needs identified by WID ‘experts’, and their control over the development process firmly
restricted” (Koczberski, 1998: 395). This reveals two underlying ideas of scholarship on
development: both the idea of the “developed” West that uses technology to save the
“backwards” South; and the parallel narrative of the weak woman in need of saving,
oppressed by her “savage” culture. “By constructing such essentialized categories of
analysis, holds Mohanty, both Western scholarship, and the literature of the WID
framework, (re)estabslish binaries, such as between men and women, black and white,
modern and traditional. Mohanty thus illustrates why a study of representation within the
development discourse is crucial. While WID scholars and practitioners talk about the
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empowerment of “women” generally, a closer reading of the policies and strategies of
this framework reveals that such ambitions mean something different altogether for
“Western women” than for the women of the “Global South.” Drawing on the insights of
Mohanty, Ingrid Palmary’s study of the place of culture within refugee law finds within
UNHCR policy documents “an ambivalent treatment of culture as both protective of
women as well as the source of women’s oppression in societies that are loosely
identified as ‘traditional’” (2008: 125). She finds that the categories of tradition, culture,
and gender are conflated, and that culture is treated in the “static and uncontested way
now so thoroughly critiqued” by Mohanty and other feminist researchers (2008: 125).
When categories of culture, race and gender is utilized in this way, the “source of
women’s oppression is located in her culture and her men rather than in a global system
of inequality perpetuated through universal humanisms” (Palmary, 2008: 132). This
illustrates the ways in which discourse shapes how a problem is understood, and in turn,
which policy options are seen as effective and appropriate responses.
As this section has established, the feminist engagement with international law and the
refugee concept draws our attention to the ways in which gender is constructed and
understood as a (legal) category, and how meaning is created through our interpretation
of language and definitions. When looking at feminist engagement with international law
generally, and refugee law specifically, however, it is important to remember that
feminist critique is not one unison voice. Rather, feminist engagement is multifaceted and
dynamic – where they might “agree on the goal of equality, they disagree about its
meaning and how to achieve it” (Edwards, 2011: 37). This is also true within the feminist
engagement with refugee law. While the overarching goal is generally the same – to
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analyze and/or amend the historic exclusion of women’s point of view within refugee law
– there is significant disagreement in terms of how this is best achieved. Within the
literature on this topic, at least two main diverging approaches emerge. On the one side,
scholars and activists argue that the refugee definition, as it appears in the Convention,
can and should be interpreted in new and creative ways in order to ensure proper gender
sensitivity in the ways we understand the conditions of an asylum claim. On the other
hand, scholars also hold that women’s point of view can (only) be sufficiently
incorporated through modification of the language and definition itself, mainly in the
form of adding gender as an additional sixth enumerated ground for persecution. In the
next section of the literature review, I look closer at this specific part of the discussion on
gender and the refugee law, which concerns the Convention definition in particular, and
how it can become gender-inclusive.
2.C. Textual Addition or Interpretive Inclusion?
Considering that second article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
specifically prohibits discrimination on the grounds of “sex” or “gender,” scholars and
practitioners have questioned why gender is not added to the refugee Convention as a
sixth enumerated ground of persecution. One argument used in supporting a textual
addition of gender is that the male bias built into the law can only be redressed by the
addition of a gender nexus, because only this will “send a definitive message to asylum
adjudicators that they must treat gender-based persecution as they do other forms of
persecution” (Bosi, 2004: 812). In other words, this argument holds that despite the
existence of guidelines providing legal interpretive guidance, inconsistencies continue to
occur, with unfavorable outcomes for women (Chan, 2011: 172; Bosi, 2004: 812).
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Scholars furthermore argue that the lack of such a category subjects women claimants to
a higher burden of proof (Chan, 2011: 185), as their gender-related claims must be
brought and formulated “through” one of the other five grounds – even in cases where the
claimants were abused “solely on the basis of their gender” (Bosi: 804). In the U.S.
context, Chan (2011) and Bosi (2004) argue that despite the existence of guidelines,
decision makers frequently struggle to find a consistent way to reconcile or incorporate
gender-based claims within one of the other five enumerated categories (Chan, 2011:
173; Bosi, 2004: 795). In this regards, Bosi notes that the majority of adjudicators
evaluating asylum applications are male, in a society which continues to privilege the
male “public” sphere over the female “private” one (2004: 795).
Drawing on feminist critique of the “adding on” approach to women’s concerns, Schenk
(1994) argues that the creation of a separate gender nexus, as opposed to a language of
“women’s rights,” avoids “treating gender as difference,” and thus avoids an essentialist
approach to gender identity (339). With the aim to improve “protection for women
without acknowledging the existence of gender differences” (339), an additional gender
nexus would be preferable, according to Schenk, as it does not “require any radical
reconstruction of the definition of ‘persecution’ or ‘human rights’ in light of women’s
unique experiences. It simply asks for the even and consistent application of the law with
respect to all types of persecution, including gender persecution” (1994: 339).
Chan (2011) further asserts that the addition of a free-standing, although restricted,
gender nexus within U.S. refugee law will affect the framework, or vocabulary, available
for women in formulating their claims to asylum based on gender-related persecution. As
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“the forced classification of gender-based claims into one of three categories [religion,
particular social group, or political opinion] frequently misrepresents the critical gender
component of many claims,” (Chan, 2011: 186) the addition of a gender nexus would
serve to highlight the gendered aspects of the claim, while providing a more accurate
language with which to express gendered experiences. Adding a gender category would,
then, be a “way of acknowledging the legitimacy of certain gender-based asylum claims”
(Chan, 2011: 177). Similarly, Bosi contends that “[g]ender persecution should not veil
itself behind the classification of a ‘social group.’ Rather gender should and can be a
category in its own right” (2004: 798, footnotes omitted).
Within the existing jurisprudence, the “particular social group” (PSG) nexus is the
ground most frequently invoked to frame asylum claims in which gender is the ground of
persecution (Edwards, 2010: 28; Neacsu, 2003: 194). Proponents of adding a gender
nexus therefore argue that the conditions that this category provides for women claimants
should be taken into consideration. The argument is that the absence of any clear
academic or legal definition of what constitutes a PSG makes it a “theoretically and
empirically vexing category” (Bosi, 2004: 791), whose definition is “ambiguous, narrow,
and contrived” (Chan, 2011: 180). Bosi furthermore argues that the strategy of evoking a
PSG in order to frame gender-related claims has “created an often mechanistic and
reductive classification problem by creating artificial sub-categories that are arbitrarily
either denied or granted asylum” (2004: 792). This unpredictability, in turn, leaves
intolerable room to for adjudicators to apply interpretations that excludes women’s
experiences, and the arbitrariness of Courts in accepting various gender-related groups as
PSGs makes this strategy an unpredictable one. Schenk further argues that the PSG
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definition is problematic in that it runs the risk of either excluding gender-related groups
through a too narrow definition on the one hand, or “subsuming the entire framework of
asylum law” on the other, rendering the remaining grounds superfluous (Schenk, 1994:
336). Similarly, Edwards finds that “[i]n many jurisdictions, PSG has now become the
default ground for women’s claims, even when one or more of the other grounds may be
equally or more applicable” (2010: 28).
Contrary to this approach, other scholars and practitioners hold that gender-sensitive
interpretation of the already existing definition will be a preferable way to include
women’s point of view. Rodger Haines states, for instance, that
[n]either the refugee definition nor the 1951 Convention in general refers to sex or
gender. This omission is, however, without significance. The ordinary meaning of
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention in its context and in the light of the object
and purpose of the Convention requires the conclusion that the Convention
protects both women and men and that it must therefore be given a genderinclusive and gender-sensitive interpretation (2003: 323-4).
This argument holds that there is room within the existing legal structures to incorporate
gender-based claims (Greatbatch, 1989; Bahl 1997). Argumentation frequently refer to
the object and purpose of the Convention to provide protection based on universal
standards, and that gender is therefore integral parts of the refugee inquiry: “[s]ince men,
women, and children can be persecuted in different ways and since Article 1A(2)
demands an inquiry into the specific characteristics and circumstances of the individual
claimant, the sex and/or age of the refugee claimant are integral elements of the refugee
inquiry” (Haines, 2003: 325). Greatbatch also argues that greater gender-sensitivity can
in fact be achieved within the existing structure of the Convention:
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[a] human rights based approach to defining persecution, the recognition of
women as a particular social group, documentation of discriminatory and
repressive measures aimed at or particularly affecting women, access to full and
fair determination procedures, and a liberal reading of the Convention definition,
would provide the basis for the development of a profile of gender-based refugee
claims, and for recognition of the difference gender makes” (1989: 526).
Similarly, Anjana Bahl holds that a an interpretation of persecution that recognizes
violence against women in addition to an understanding that women can constitute a
PSG, are necessary in order to include women claimants, establishing that “[t]he present
legislation, both in the United States and internationally, can accommodate these claims
within the existing infrastructure” (1997:73). Greatbatch furthermore holds that “simply”
adding on gender as a separate nexus will not amend the interpretive challenges involved
in determining refugee status (Greatbacth, 1989: 518). This strategy, she argues,
“assumes consensus on the nature of gender-based persecution” (Greatbatch, 1989: 518).
In other words, an additional gender category, and related concepts such as “genderbased persecution,” will also require interpretive practice, and does therefore not avoid
the potential ambiguity and inconsistency that results from interpretation.
Haines lastly argues that not only is there “no realistic prospects” of an addition of a sixth
category to the Convention; such an expansion of the definition may even have a negative
impact for women claimants: “the argument in favour of a sixth ground may have the
unintended effect of further marginalizing women if misinterpreted as an implicit
concession that sex and gender have no place in refugee law at the present” (2003: 326-7).
This echoes the intentions of gender mainstreaming as a method, that gender should be
understood as an all-encompassing concept, present within all aspect of policy and law,
and not addressed separately. The approach of gender-sensitive interpretation seems to
place a greater emphasis on the intentions of the Convention in extending protection
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indiscriminately, and that insight in these intentions should guide its reading and
interpretation. This locates the problem not as an issue of the formulation of the law itself,
but rather of it being read from a partial perspective (Haines, 2003: 327).
2.D. Concluding Remarks: Outlining the Question and the Research Plan
Drawing on the Foucauldian idea that policy problems are discoursively constructed, the
feminist critique has demonstrated the ways that international policy and law is shaped by
assumptions about gender and the categories of “women” and “men.” Whereas the WID
scholars assume that women’s concerns can be added to the existing structures without
questioning the ways such structures themselves are inherently gendered, the proponents
of gender mainstreaming rather hold that a gender-focus should be diffused throughout
international institutions. The differences between such feminist strategies demonstrate
that distinctive notions of gender always underpin such approaches, and shapes how the
problem of gender inequality is understood and what policy responses are seen as
appropriate. But the insight brought by feminist scholars is not only that notions of
gender shapes policy and law in these ways; it is also that policy and law in turn manage
and construct different understandings of “men” and “women.” From gendered and
racialized depictions of the male, white refugee, as an individual who heroically flees
state oppression, imagery has shifted towards unnamed masses of “women-and-children”
from the Global South, inherently constructed and seen as victims. These ways of
(re)presenting “the refugee” not only draw on prejudices of the male and the female, and
of blacks and whites, but also perpetuate and construct such stereotypes.
Because the issue of gender inequality within the refugee law is so complex, there is no
simple solution, no quick fix, by which the refugee definition can become gender-
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inclusive. Scholars and practitioners disagree on whether gendered experiences of
persecution should be incorporated into the scope of refugee law through adding gender
as a sixth protected ground within the Convention, or by employing gender-sensitive
interpretations of the already existing definition. It is noteworthy, however, that both
these stances seem to point to language and interpretation as part of the issue. Proponents
of a freestanding gender nexus argue that without gender as a separate category, women
are forced to classify and formulate their claims as based on “political opinions,” or
“particular social groups” and so on, which in turn downplays or misrepresents the
gender component of their claims. Proponents of conducting gender-sensitive
interpretation, on their part, argue that adding gender as a category will not bypass
interpretive challenges, because the term “gender” (and other terms associated with it),
must also be interpreted. Bridging these two “sides” is the common presumption that
what creates barriers for women claimants is the very way (legal) language is read and
interpreted. What this point demonstrates, I argue, is that in the debate on textual
amendment versus interpretive inclusion, one loses sight of the greater question of how
gender itself is discursively constructed as a category within legal language, and how this
category is subsequently read and made intelligible to the law. Whether added as a nexus
to the Convention definition, or employed as a guide on how to interpret the existing
definition, “gender” is a term that will itself be subject to differing legal understandings
and readings. I therefore argue that there is a need within this debate to address how the
category of “gender” is itself read and made intelligible to the law. The issue of gender
within refugee law is ultimately a question of what it means to be recognized by law, to
be able to speak to the law and have one’s claims heard. This problem necessitates an
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investigation of the terms in and through which victims of gender-related persecution
may appear before the law and seek rights. This thesis addresses this need.
In order to take up such a project, I will turn in the next chapters to the UNHCR
publication “Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within
the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to
the Status of Refugees” (in the following referred to as the Guidelines). This text enters
the debate on how to achieve a refugee law that is gender inclusive, as it seeks to provide
guidance to decision-makers on how to conduct a gender-sensitive interpretation of the
refugee definition. In terms of the need identified above – to identify how gender as a
category might be read within law – it is important to look at how the Guidelines itself
construct the category of “gender.” This endeavor will contribute to inquiries into how
gender is constituted vis-à-vis the refugee concept. It is interesting to look at the
UNHCR’s stance on how a person’s gender may interrelate with their refugee status, as
this may tell us something more general about how gender is seen and constructed as a
form of identity. Thus, I will in this thesis do a close reading of the UNHCR 2002
Guidelines in order to answer the following question:
How does the UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution define the relationship
between refugee status and gender?
Based on this close reading of the UNHCR Gender Guidelines, I argue that the
relationship between gender and the refugee status is one in which gender becomes a
ground, or base, for the refugee status. Gender is treated as stable, confined, and easily
recognized as separate to other identity markers, such as race or nationality. Based on this
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argument, I assert that the Guidelines ultimately entails a performative contradiction. In
attempting to make gender intelligible to the law by constructing it as a coherent ground,
the Guidelines struggle to pin down the words with which gender-claims may be
expressed within law, as their meaning becomes conflated and confused throughout the
document. That is, the Guidelines ultimately cannot establish gender as a ground in this
way, as the word with which to express gender slips. In attempting to define gender as a
ground, the Guidelines do not account for the ways that gender identity is not
experienced, nor articulated, in the same way for all individuals.
I develop my analysis in three parts. Firstly, I address how the Guidelines constructs the
problem of gender within refugee law and sets up the best-fitted solution. Here, I argue
that the issue is defined as a lack of recognition of women’s claims, in that it is the biased
reading of the law that has produced gender-disparity within the refugee regime.
Promotion more gender-sensitive interpretations of the Convention thus becomes the
most appropriate solution. Secondly, as my question concerns how gender is discursively
constructed, I look closer at the vocabulary, terms, and concepts the Guidelines offers in
describing and constructing gender. I find that the Guidelines clearly defines and
distinguishes key concepts in describing gender as an identity – such as “sex” “gender,”
“sexuality,” “women,” and “men” – but that the definition of such terms break down in
practice, as they are conflated and used interchangeably throughout the document. The
third inquiry concerns how the Guidelines establishes the relationships between the
gender category and the various elements of the refugee definition. I argue that the
Guidelines treats gender as an enclosed and confined entity, separate from the other
definition elements, such as notably race, and nationality. The Guidelines does not
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address gender identity as it may intersect with the other convention grounds to make up
unique experiences that may be expressed within law. The next chapter outlines the
components and techniques of close reading as a method, and explores how this
methodology is suitable in reading for the ways gender is discursively constructed within
the Guidelines.
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Chapter Three - Method

The Methodology of Close Reading: Language and Power
My research question concerns how the UNHCR Gender Guidelines defines the
relationship between the refugee status and gender. To investigate such a relationship, it
is necessary to employ a methodology that will allow me to address how language
constructs meaning. This chapter explores the way such a study may be carried out.
There are many ways to approach topics relating to gender and the refugee status. My
question, however, is specifically concerned with the ways in which texts themselves
illuminate how international organizations create the possibilities and limits for
establishing refugee status. Thus, this thesis is concerned with the discursive construction
of the gender category within the Guidelines, and how this category might be read. To
better understand the relationship between gender and refugee status, then, I turn to the
methodology of close reading to analyze how language constructs meaning. I argue that
close reading is best suited to investigate the question at hand, because of the
attentiveness of close reading to the ways text is socially situated, and how power may be
embedded in language.
As a method, close reading is more that just a set of techniques, it is also built on several
theoretical insights about how language is socially situated. Close reading presumes that
words and concepts are never neutral or given, but that their meaning is always contextbound and socially constructed. This, in turn, means that close attention should be paid
not only to what is said in the text “at the outset” in terms of the claims and statements
asserted in the text, but also how these claims are argued and structurally constituted
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within the text, and the meanings conveyed by each of these elements. In other words, a
close textual reading allows us to understand how meaning is created through the relation
between what is said and how it is said. An understanding of these theoretical aspects of
close reading, particularly in terms of the social function of language, is crucial in order
to grasp both how the method works, but also why this form of analysis is important
within the field of social sciences. In the following section, I will therefore look closer at
what a close reading is, before I articulate the more specific tools and techniques of
analysis that this method offers.
3.A. Theoretical Background: The Social Function of Language
Close reading is defined, in Barry Brummett’s book Techniques of Close Reading, as “the
mindful, disciplined reading of an object with a view to deeper understanding of its
meanings” (2010: 3). This phrase gives several pointers as to what separates a close
reading from simply reading a text, the first an academic exercise, and the last something
most of us do on a daily basis. Close reading is disciplined in that it is an attentive,
rigorous, and purposeful reading, often guided by techniques and theories, which in turn
enables the reader to go deeper into the text beyond what is on the surface (Brummett,
2010: 28). The vocabulary of “surface” and “going deeper” indicates the
conceptualization of linguistic exchange as taking place on several levels at the same
time, or alternatively, as containing multiple layers. This idea that language and text have
multiple layers of meaning indicates that this meaning can be created –and located – on
various “places” in a text, depending on the angle and attention of the reader. The
methodology of close reading is attentive to the ways meaning exists within the various
levels and components of a text, at the intersection between what is being said and how
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this is expressed, and that one word can be understood in different ways depending on the
“level” on which the reading is done and the context in which one does that reading.
There is more to discover in a text than what is directly expressed on the surface, and
meanings may shift as we shift the focus.
The insight that the meaning derived from a text depends on the angle and context of the
reader is precisely what the feminist critique of the refugee law has demonstrated, as the
seemingly neutral Convention text engendered biased understandings and interpretations
of what it means to be a refugee. When the concept “persecution,” for example, is read
within the context of a society in which the “private” and “public” spheres are coded as
gendered – and where the individuals doing the reading are predominately male – what
appears to be a gender-neutral concept may in fact be read in male-biased ways. A close
reading questions and analyzes such meanings and ideas that might be “read into” a text
by investigating each single word, concept, and argument and how these textual
components might purvey certain assumptions. Thus, the close reading is fit to answer
questions about how rhetoric and language manages meaning, which is a crucial exercise
when it comes to the field of law.
When doing a close reading, then, the goal is to uncover meaning, which Brummett
describes as “the thoughts, feelings, and associations that are suggested by words,
images, objects, actions, and messages” (2010: 6). In the words of Nealon and Giroux,
“[i]t is this examining or questioning of meaning that is the corner stone of social theory”
(2003: 23). However, the concept of meaning is a tricky one, as it is neither entirely
subjective (in which case there would be no point in studying it) nor entirely objective
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(which would mean we had to reject the idea of different points of view altogether). The
idea of language as a social activity – as an inherently social, not natural, phenomenon
(Nealon and Giroux, 2003: 24) – is what turns us towards meaning as situated between
the subjective and objective, as a socially (and collectively) constructed phenomenon. In
other words, when we conduct a close reading we are looking for socially shared
meanings. These are ideas that are reasonable or plausible within a certain context, in the
sense of a historical, cultural and social framework that makes concepts and language
meaningful: “[w]ords and events have a history of meanings and usages; like the texts in
which they are sometimes contained, they only mean something within a specific
context” (Nealon and Giroux, 2003: 24). Meaning is only conceivable in a socially
specific framework, which is why “[t]he rhetorician questions the […] faith that ideas
represented by words can be grasped irrespective of their utterance in particular times and
places” (Constable, 2005: 16). The premise that meaning is socially situated makes the
study of text and language not only conceivable, but also crucial in order to uncover the
ways social relations are forged and perpetuated through text. This notion is the basis for
asking the question of how gender is represented and constituted within the UNHCR
Guidelines, and how this relationship, in turn, may be read. The method of close reading
is well suited to investigate such questions because it allows the reader to go beyond what
is explicitly stated in the text, to the more subtle nuances and concealed meanings and
implications.
The emergence of this insight represents what is called the linguistic turn in the social
sciences (Fairclough, 1989: 3), highlighting language and its social role, and where,
among others, Michel Foucault have made valuable contributions. In his book
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Archeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault used the term “discourse” to describe
systematic ways in which we think and talk about things (76), or “a certain ‘way of
speaking’ […] invested […] in a system of prohibitions and values” (193). These
discourses have certain sets of “laws” and values that govern what can be said and how it
can be said within that particular discursive field; rules that authorize some statements
and preclude others (Foucault, 1972: 27-28). Discourses draw this sense of authority and
normativity from systems of knowledge. In the discursive formation (or field) of
medicine, for instance, certain types of knowledge serve to justify and legitimate the
statements that can be made and how they can be made, within this particular discourse.
According to Foucault, then, discursive formations are constructed around orderly
systems knowledge. Through the collection and authorization of certain forms of
knowledge, discourses are productive; they are: “practices that systematically form the
objects of which they speak” (49). Discourses form objects by constructing and utilizing
essentialized categories of people, such as the “homosexual,” the “woman,” or the
“refugee” for that matter – categories or labels people are predisposed to take for granted
and accept as “natural” entities. For example, Nyers (1999) has uncovered “the way in
which the category of the ‘refugee’ has been invented and naturalized as being a
‘problem’ for the international system of states” (4). Invoking a vocabulary of “problem,
crisis, challenge, and control,” in turn, shapes our understanding of the phenomenon in a
profound way:
if we think of discourse as Foucault does – that is, as a (violent) practice through
which the objects and practices that constitute the world are regulated and
controlled, categorized and evaluated – then we will recognize that like any other
discourse, a discourse of the ‘emergency’ works to enable some questions while
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disabling others; it attempts to control which objects, propositions, and forms of
analysis are ‘normal’ and acceptable, and which are not (Nyers, 1999: 11).
Both the discourse analysis and the rhetoric analysis focus on how people are affected
and influenced by language, how the words we choose do not merely reflect, but also
profoundly shape, our understanding of the subject being discussed. The example above
illustrates that the ways in which we talk about things not merely expresses but also
structures how we think about and understand them. This insight that language also
constitutes – that it sets limits and affects the ways in which we understand the world –
draws our attention to how language is tied to power. Foucault therefore turns our
attention towards what can be termed the “politics of representation,” in which some have
the power to represent others and to be represented, while others are silenced.
In these ways, close reading is a valuable exercise as it uncovers how power structures
may be embedded in texts. One of the ways in which power can operate through
language, writes Foucault, is therefore by predisposing the readers to take certain
assumptions for granted; to accept them as “truth,” or as self-evident. “We must question
those ready-made syntheses, those grouping that we normally accept before any
examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset” (1972: 22), he
argues. Such ideas are hard to challenge, precisely because we do not normally critique
what we take for granted. The close reading differs from the everyday reading in that it
looks for and pays attention to such power structures contained within a text. The close
reader looks for silences and omission, asks who is empowered and disempowered, and
questions that which appears self-evident, and how the text establishes authority.

54
The theoretical insights which underpin the methodology of close reading are that
ideologies and evaluations are coded in language, which in turn has the power to shape
our outlook and understanding of the topics discussed. These notions of power and
language will make up the framework of the analysis conducted in this paper. Although
the approach taken in this thesis is more inductive in nature (in terms of not applying a
specific theory), it is still necessary to use certain “habits, tricks, and knacks (…) ‘on the
ground’ once inside a text” (Brummett, 2010: 29), as pointers to what to look for and
where to look. I will draw on the works of Doxtader (1995) and Constable (2005) to
establish more precisely what a close reading looks for in analyzing institutionally
produced text and legal language, respectively. They both point to the importance of
looking closer at the arguments offered within institutional and legal texts, and how such
texts convince the reader of how the problem at hand should be understood and
responded to. Thus, I argue that the techniques related to ideology and argument will be
of particular interest for this analysis. The next part of this section will look more
generally at what it means to do a close reading, how to look for the taken-for granted and
uncover assumptions, and where to direct the focus.
3.B. Techniques of Close Reading
Brummett points to the fact that ways of thinking tend to be systematic, as in that certain
values tend to be connected to others (2010: 97). One can say that values and attitudes are
often part of a broader worldview, a net of ideas and perceptions about how the world is
and should be. Brummett holds that it is these webs of interlinked convictions and
commitments that can be called ideology, and offers the following generic definition:
“Ideology is a systematic network of beliefs, commitments, values, and assumptions that
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influence how power is maintained, struggled over and resisted” (99). Such worldviews
will not only shape what the actor says, but also the ways in which he or she asserts the
claim, and how it is justified or argued. Looking closely at the various forms of definition
and justifications asserted in a text is therefore a way to access the underlying nets of
assumptions and beliefs, which may not be expressed directly.
Drawing on the insight of Habermas regarding the relationship between communication
and democratic participation, Erik Doxtader (1995) establishes the importance of
analyzing argumentation – particularly as it appears within the context of institutions
claiming legitimacy and justifying their mission vis-à-vis citizens (189). Through
argumentation, institutions within specific social contexts may claim to represent (and
simultaneously define) concepts, such as for instance that of the “public good” (185).
Real power is embedded in institutional arguments and reasoning, as these discursive acts
allow institutions to establish the rules and norms framing the public debate on the topic.
Thus, institutions “prescrib[e] ‘acceptable’ modes of interaction,” (185) which in turn
works to “screen out” the claims of interests that do not conform to these norms (185),
such as for instance criticism of the assumptions the institution assert. Doxtader calls for
the investigation of such institutional “moments of definitional and justificatory
argument” (190), as they reveal how certain perspectives are validated and naturalized,
while others are disabled. Therefore, “the study of institutional argument investigates
how institutions enter into, structure, and perhaps take over public debate” (190). The
analysis of institutional arguments, then, provides a view into the tools everyday citizens
have to make demands of institutions. Furthermore, when it comes to policy, institutions
use argumentation to define what problems comes under its scope, the significance of
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such problems, and which solutions are the best available to respond to these issues
(197). Or to say it in the words of Olivius:
As feminist policy scholars have convincingly argued, dominant discourses in a
given issue area will determine how an issue or a ‘policy problem’ is interpreted,
if it is perceived as problematic at all, and consequently what kind of policy
response (if any) that will be considered reasonable and legitimate. When
something is considered to be a problem that should be addressed by policy, it is
of crucial importance what kind of problem it is constructed to be, for whom, and
caused by what (Olivius, 2010: 3).
By defining whether an issue is to be understood as a problem, institutional
argumentation works to limit the ability of the individual to partake in the formulation of
social problems and their solutions, and in this way, institutional argumentation is tied to
authority. A close reading should look critically at the definitions and justifications
offered in constructing policy problems and solutions, because such definitions ultimately
have to be interpreted from the texts of institutional arguments themselves.
Marianne Constable builds on this insight by suggesting that the close reader should not
only pay attention to specific arguments and definitions in the text, but also the manner in
which they are offered – from the entire structure of the text to the choice of words. In
short, a close reading should look for “what is revealed in the use of particular language
in particular texts” (Constable, 2005: 14). In writing about the rhetorical analysis of legal
texts, Constable describes various aspects and functions of the legal text, and the sentral
notion of “how law tells the one whom it tells what to do” (2005: 19). This points to
several questions to ask when doing a close reading, including who the audience is, what
the message is, and how the audience is compelled to accept this message. Similarly,
Brummett reminds the close reader to ask what claims or conclusions the text leads it
audience to accept, and what evidence is offered to support such claims (Brummett, 101-
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103). Constable shows some specific ways legal text may convey “what needs to be
done,” such as for instance “via example, by cognizing statements of rules, by threats and
coercion, through revelation, through moral knowledge, through legal reasoning, through
deliberation or strategy” (2005: 19). When doing a close reading, it can be useful to look
for such rhetorical techniques, or ways of conveying a message.
In so far as the worldviews or fundamental ideas that makes the basis for an argument or
a text are often taken for self-evident truth by the authors themselves, certain ideas will
appear as taken for granted, or just assumed in the text. When reading closely, one should
be alert to such statements that appear obvious or ‘natural.’ As Foucault reminds us,
[t]hese pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted
without question, must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected definitely,
of course, but the tranquility with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we
must show that they do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of
a construction the rules of which must be known, and the justification of which
must be scrutinized (1972: 25).
More specifically, in looking closer at the argumentation offered in a text, attention
should also focus on what the text asks the reader to assume in order to “make the
arguments work” (Brummett, 2010), or ideas that are taken for granted within the text
itself. Drawing on the insight of Doxtader that the definitions and concepts used in
institutional argumentation may have the power to shape the public opinion (1995: 185),
it becomes particularly important to look for that which appears “natural,” and how it
works to empower some points of view, while disempowering others.
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3.C. Concluding Remarks
Once “on the ground inside the text” of the UNHCR Guidelines, to borrow Brummett’s
words, these notions of power and language, and how components of the text convey
meaning, will guide the analysis. In looking for how the relationship between gender and
refugee status is constructed, I analyze the definitions and justifications, as well as the
silences or presumptions in the text, while considering the audiences and the effect of the
language. Specifically, I will start out more broadly by looking at how the text establishes
the “problem” of gender within refugee law, and the larger justifications and
argumentation that frames the approach and solutions chosen in the text, namely that of
interpretative inclusion. From there, I look closer at the words and language used to
describe different concept and ideas, particularly the concepts of “gender-related”
persecution, as well as “gender” and “sex,” and the implications of this for how gender is
to be understood in the refugee context. I try to unveil the taken-for granted by
questioning the statements and arguments made in the text, and by showing alternative
approaches and descriptions that could have been used. Finally, I look for how the
category of gender is established in relation to the various elements of the refugee
definition, and how these relations work to construct gender as a discursive category.
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Chapter Four – Analysis

The Discursive Construction of Gender as a Ground
in the UNHCR Guidelines
The story of feminist engagement with refugee law has not been one of a linear
development. There has not been a simple transition through neatly separated phases; no
stable movement from the initial exclusion of gender in general – and women in
particular – as a concern for refugee law, through the “discovery” of gender and women
as new subjects of knowledge, culminating in the amendment of the lacuna through the
final stage of gender inclusion. Rather, the previous chapters have demonstrated that the
relationship between refugee law and the concept of gender has been one of struggle and
contestation, as practitioners, scholars and adjudicators grapple with the gender concept,
and the question of how to reconcile it within a legal framework that speaks in a male
language. We have also seen that this struggle, and its implications, is of particular
interest for scholars interested women’s and LGBT rights; not because questions of
gender are not of concern for heterosexual men, of course, but because it is the male
heterosexual experience, as stereotypically understood, that forms the foundation from
which refugee law and its language has sprung. Heterosexual men “escape” the
challenges involved in expressing their gender and sexuality before the law, because their
gender and sexuality is already there, in the language of the law, and in the interpretation
and application of its terms. It is only when individuals who do not conform to this
constructed norm stand before the law that the problem of gender becomes visible,
because it becomes apparent that they do not have the language with which to (re)present
themselves and their experiences. It is within these moments that we see that the law
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struggles, in a sense, in its confusion between different terms and their application. We
have also seen that this struggle, then, is, in its deepest sense, a question of language,
because the trouble appears as individuals are trying to formulate or express their
identities and experiences before the law, but struggle to find the words.
The contested history of how gender has been understood within international refugee
law demonstrates the importance of continued critical engagement with the ways gender
is understood within human rights instruments and publications. The analysis undertaken
in this thesis therefore seeks to contribute to the ongoing discussion of how gender is
constructed and articulated within refugee law. In order to do so, I analyze the notion of
gender as it appears within UNHCR’s guidelines on how to conduct gender-sensitive
interpretation of the Convention language, titled “Guidelines on International Protection:
Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees” (in the following referred to
as the Guidelines). I have chosen this publication because it represents a direct response
to the confusion and unpredictability surrounding gender-related cases, and attempts to
define the problem and provide redress to the issue. I employ the methodology of close
reading, and conduct a line for line reading of the UNHCR Guidelines in order to answer
the question of how the relationship between refugee status and gender is defined.
I ultimately argue that in its attempt to make gender intelligible to the law, the Guidelines
constructs the relationship between gender and the refugee status as one in which gender
is a ground from which action or violence emerges. This, in turn, presupposes gender as a
stable and fixed category or part of identity. I build this argument in three stages. First, I
explore how the Guidelines frames the issue of gender within refugee law, arguing that
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gender inequality within case law is understood as a problem of language, in that
interpretations of the refugee Convention fails to recognize claims asserted by women.
Secondly, then, I turn to the language and terms that the Guidelines itself offers the
reader in speaking of gender, how gender-related terms are defined and used throughout
the document, and how such terms are properly interpreted and applied according to the
Guidelines. I argue that even as the Guidelines seeks to provide directives on how to
interpret language in a gender-sensitive way, this document too struggles to find a
vocabulary through which one can express gender within refugee law in a comprehensive
way. Lastly, I look at how the various relationships between gender and the different
elements of the refugee definition are constructed and defined, specifically how gender is
though to relate to the persecution concept and each of the five enumerated Convention
grounds. I argue here that the relationship between gender and the persecution concept is
problematic within the Guidelines, as the document fails to distinguish between genderrelated and gender-specific persecution – that is, between gender as the cause of
persecution, and as shaping the form of the violence. I assert that the document ultimately
offers a definition of gender identity in which gender is treated as a separate and confined
category, in the sense that it can be analyzed and addressed “outside of” the other
definition elements, particularly race and nationality. This is because the Guidelines fails
to acknowledge how gender may stand in a causal relationship to persecution, also when
it intersects with race and nationality as grounds for persecution. I argue that the
Guidelines, in other words, lacks a sense of intersectionality, and therefore cannot
adequately correspond to lived experiences “on the ground”.
Thus, I assert that there exists a performative contradiction within the Guidelines. That is,
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the document constructs and treats gender as a fixed and separate ground, but the text
itself is ultimately unable to pin down the language and terms needed to represent gender
in this way. The very language and terms the Guidelines employs in defining and
articulating gender is conflated and confused throughout the text; the seemingly clear
definitions of, and distinctions between, various gender-related terms the Guidelines
offers the reader, slip away or break down throughout the text. Therefore, the
performative contradiction arises from the way the Guidelines constructs gender as a
fixed and separate ground, while the language used by the text itself betrays and points to
the ways gender is in fact not stable or fixed, nor enclosed and separate from other
aspects of identity, and not experienced the same way by everyone.
4.A. Framing the Issue of Gender Within Refugee Law
The Guidelines should be read against the backdrop of a still developing academic and
legal debate that addresses how the refugee category is gendered. Although the exclusion
of women’s experiences is generally identified as a wrong that should be rectified, there
are differences in terms of what is seen as the reasons for this exclusion, and the ways
amendments should be made. This first section of the analysis looks closer at the way the
Guidelines defines the problem of how gender relates to the refugee status, how they
arrive at this understanding, and how this formulation of the problematic is used to justify
their chosen response. I argue that the Guidelines establish gender inequality within
refugee law as a problem of interpretation and recognition, rather than the refugee
Convention text, or the human rights system in itself.
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The very first sentence of the Guidelines states that “’[g]ender-related persecution’ is a
term that has no legal meaning per se” (article 1). This is an interesting opening of the
text, because it both establishes the framework for the discussion that is to come as one of
legal terms and their meanings, while also pointing towards the problem inherent in the
relationship between gender and refugee law: that law does not have the terms to describe
gendered persecution. The statement can be read as creating a framework in which the
approach of gender-sensitive interpretation is favored over that of altering the text of the
refugee definition. It does so because it implies that even if the concepts of gender and
gender-based persecution are formally introduced into the language of the law, their
meaning would still be unclear and subject to interpretation and differing definitions in
any case. The term “gender-related persecution” has no clear meaning within law, and
therefore remains a problematic point of departure within law that necessitates guidelines
on how to understand it. The Guidelines chooses to “specifically focus on the
interpretation of the refugee definition […] from a gender perspective as well as propose
some procedural practices” (article 1). It does this in order to “ensure that […] the range
of gender-related claims are recognized as such” (article 1). Gender inequality within
refugee law is in other words a question of recognition; of how to recognize genderelements within a legal language where such terms have no meaning “per se.”
From the introduction of the problem, the Guidelines proceeds to provide the
background of the issue. The reader is informed that “[h]istorically, the refugee definition
has been interpreted through a framework of male experiences, which has meant that
many claims of women and of homosexuals, have gone unrecognized” (article 5). Again,
interpretation (and interpretive frameworks) is identified as the source of the issues
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concerning gender and the refugee definition; it is the historic reading of the law that
constitutes the problem, rather than other aspects of the law itself. In other words, the
refugee law cannot speak of gender because the male experience has historically
constituted its framework.
The articulation of gender inequality within refugee law as rooted in interpretation works
to enable certain perspectives, while excluding others. The Guidelines does not, for
instance, make a point of questioning the identity and position of the interpreter, in
asserting that the interpreters themselves have typically been male. Alternatively, the
problem of women’s (lack of) access to refugee protection could be framed by pointing to
the creation and formulation of the law itself, and the fact that it was drafted only by men.
Or, one could point out that decision- and lawmakers were, and continue to be,
predominately male (Edwards, 2011: 302), which might mean that their personal points
of view and prejudices are just as important in the (continued) exclusion of women,
regardless of whether the legal definitions are modified or whether guidelines are
published. This alternative emphasis would establish the problem of gender and the
refugee definition more as a structural and institutional problem, where people have
unequal access to positions of power where they can define, construct and interpret the
legal terms within the institutions of international law. The problem, then, would also be
an issue of participation, not only recognition, within law. Al Attar, for instance, seeks to
“conceptualize and structure more representative participatory transnational lawmaking
processes, the kind that would promote both parity of participation and actor subjectivity,
and possibly further the cause of global justice” (2013: 95). One example could be to
recommend gender quotas, or other methods of promoting equal gender representation
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and -participation, in important decision-making and international institutions. The
Guidelines does not consider any such approaches, and in defining the problem of the
relationship between gender and the refugee category as one of legal interpretations and
recognition, alternative approaches are left outside of the scope of the text. The fact that
the Guidelines chooses to describe the historic exclusion of women as caused by
(mis)interpretation and (mis)recognition makes up the framework and discourse of the
text, and something the reader is asked to assume to make the rest of the argument work.
Upon establishing the problem in these ways, the Guidelines addresses the question of
whether to add gender as a sixth enumerated ground for persecution specifically:
[e]ven though gender is not specifically referenced in the refugee definition, it is
widely accepted that it can influence or dictate, the type of persecution or harm
suffered and the reasons for this treatment. The refugee definition, properly
interpreted, therefore covers gender-related claims. As such, there is no need to
add an additional ground to the 1951 Convention definition (article 6).
The argument seems to be that a freestanding gender category would in fact be
redundant, assuming that a gender-sensitive interpretation will achieve the same results as
the addition of a gender category. The Guidelines does not evoke arguments that a gender
category may have unintended implications, or that it would go against the original
intentions of the convention, but simply that there is no need for such an amendment.
This, in turn, reflects how the problem is understood; that sex and gender are already
inherent in the scope refugee definition, as long as it is “properly” interpreted and
understood.
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The Guidelines identifies the problem of the relationship between gender and the refugee
status as one of recognizing gendered claims within the legal framework, whose language
has been interpreted within a male framework. I have shown that this is only one of
several possible ways to frame the problem, and furthermore, that this specific approach
makes the response of gender-sensitive interpretation appear “natural,” or best fitted to
amend the problem.
4.B. Language: Articulating Gender within Law
Upon establishing the nature of the problem, the Guidelines seeks to provide guidance on
how to navigate gender-related claims to the refugee status. The next section of this
analysis explores this attempt. I argue that the Guidelines tries to amend the issue by
constructing gender as a kind of ground – an intelligible space from which the violence
springs out, and which law can refer back to. In other words, gender itself is a seen as a
stable and confined place, in and through which one speaks the self to the law. This
attempt falters, however, as the document struggles to pin down words and terms
expressing gender in such a way.
The Guidelines notes that “in order to understand the nature of gender-related persecution,
it is essential to define and distinguish between the terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’” (article 3).
The text proceeds to make the following distinction:
Gender refers to the relationship between women and men based on socially or
culturally constructed and defined identities, status, roles and responsibilities that
are assigned to one sex or another, while sex is a biological determination. Gender
is not static or innate but acquires socially and culturally constructed meaning
over time (article 3).
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The Guidelines operates with a relatively clear separation between the two. On one hand,
“gender” does not refer to some innate or static quality in people, but is rather given
meanings that are culturally and socially specific, and therefore subject to change. “Sex,”
on the other hand, is given a much briefer description, signaling that this term is
comparatively unproblematic and straightforward; that is, the meaning of sex is expected
to be somewhat more obvious to the reader. Whereas the Guidelines operates with a
gender concept that is fluid, socially constructed, and tied to meaning, sex on the other
hand appears as comparably innate and determined, as the text refers to “biological
determinations” in its definition. Such understandings and definitions of sex and gender
may not, however, be accepted by everyone, as it differs from an approach that also the
meanings of the biological sex may in some ways be socially constructed and subject to
cultural and social interpretations. Feminists have, for instance, questioned the
immutability of the category (Edwards, 2010: 37) and its acceptance as natural and
uncontentious (Charlesworth, 2005: 14).
When looking closer at how “sex” and “gender” appear throughout the rest of the text,
the clear-cut separation between the two terms delineated in article 3 seems to slip away.
While “gender” is used most frequently, the word “sex” also appears several times, but
the reader is not offered any reason or explanation why one is chosen over the other in
each specific context. The Guidelines states, for instance, that “[e]ven though gender is
not specifically referenced in the refugee definition, it is widely accepted that it can
influence, or dictate, the type of persecution or harm suffered and the reasons for this
treatment” (article 6). In this sentence, it is unclear why “gender,” but not “sex,” is
specified. Only a few paragraphs later, in comparison, the text states that “[w]hile female
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and male applicants may be subjected to the same forms of harm, they may also face
forms of persecution specific to their sex” (article 9). Given the distinction given in
article 3, it might seem that using “sex” in this specific case may be a deliberate attempt
to point to how men and women are persecuted differently because of their different
biology and physique. The Guidelines does, for instance, refer to sexual violence as a
form of violence specific to, and aimed at women in particular.
However, such a distinction between violence aimed at the biological sex versus on the
socially constructed gender, may be overly simplistic. The guidelines construct sexual
violence as a form of violence aimed at women. In discussing trafficking and forced
prostitution as forms of persecution, for instance, the Guidelines only discuss “trafficked
women and minors” (article 18) – not only excluding men as victims of trafficking, but
arguably using a form of “womenandchildren” approach. In the example of racialized
violence, the Guidelines assert that men may be targets for “maiming or incarceration,”
while women may be persecuted through “sexual violence or control of reproduction”
(article 24). However, the Guidelines does not specify that persecution may take on a
different character for men or women, not only because their different physique
facilitates this, but also because certain forms of harm, such as sexual violence, may have
symbolic meanings in relation to the roles and statuses of the genders. Or put in another
way, a man may chose to persecute a woman through sexual violence, not only because
their respective physiques makes such an attack possible, but also because such an act
may at the same time offend the woman’s status as “pure” or “untouched,” and the
proscribed roles of the men in her community (a father, brother, or husband, for instance)
who “failed” to protect her. Thus, the intended victim of the act is not only the woman,
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but also the men close to her, or even her entire community. It is precisely the absence
within the Guidelines of any such discussion on how gender identity is complicated,
multifaceted, and “messy” – that it at the same time encompasses both notions of
physical or biological markers and their meanings, and the prescription of certain roles,
statuses and responsibilities – that works to reduce gender to one, stable ground. The
reader is offered seemingly straightforward definitions, without ensuing discussion of
how such distinctions might look a lot more complicated “on the ground,” where
meanings of the biological and the socially and culturally constructed may be interwoven.
In addition to this problematic distinction between gender as biological and as social, the
topic of sexual orientation is also invoked within the text in ways that blurs the
distinction between the concepts of sexuality and gender. Sexual orientation is absent
from the entire introduction of the Guidelines, where it is gender that is established as the
document’s main focus, as its goal is to “ensure that a proper consideration is given to
women claimants” (article 1). The term “homosexuals,” on the other hand, appears as a
group of concern to the Guidelines in article 5, in the sentence: “[h]istorically, the refugee
definition has been interpreted through a framework of male experiences, which has
meant that many claims of women and of homosexuals, have gone unrecognized” (article
5). Interestingly, it is not a framework of male and heteronormative experiences that is
articulated as the cause of this failure to recognize claims based on sexual orientation.
The exclusion of homosexuals is rather identified as the result of reading through a male
framework. In effect, to be gay is by definition here, not to be male.
The terms “sex” and “gender” are furthermore used interchangeably with “women” in
several places. This, in turn, implies that it is mainly women claimants the Guidelines
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seeks to aid. The Guidelines does provide some justification for emphasizing women in
stating that “[g]ender-related claims may be brought by either women or men, although
due to particular types of persecution, they are more commonly brought by women”
(article 3). Despite the somewhat unclear reason offered to the reader (“due to particular
types of persecution”), the notion is presumably that it is mainly women who lack the
terms with which to present themselves and their experiences of persecution to the law,
and who have been historically excluded from the reading of it. It is, in other words,
primarily women who lack a place and a voice with refugee law. However, the silence
that exists when it comes to men’s experiences of gender-related persecution is
significant, particularly in light of the fact that the Guidelines does discuss homosexual
men to some extent, recognizing that “[r]efugee claims based on differing sexual
orientation contain a gender element” (article 16).
In terms of conflating “gender” or “sex” with “women,” the Guidelines does at several
points state that a gender-sensitive focus is important, subsequently using only the
examples of women only to show why this is so. The case of religion is one example,
where persecution arising from failure to comply with religious mores is only discussed
in the case of women. For example the Guidelines explains that: “[i]n certain States, the
religion assigns particular roles or behavioural codes to women and men respectively.
Where a woman does not fulfill her assigned role or refuses to abide by the codes, and is
punished as a consequence, she may have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of religion” (article 25). Similarly, in determining the category of “political
opinion” it is stated that “[t]he image of a political refugee as someone who is fleeing
persecution for his or her direct involvement in political activity does not always
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correspond to the reality of the experiences of women in some societies” (article 33).
Again, the Guidelines jumps from “his or her” to “women” in one sentence. This is
significant because both these examples are instances where it would be highly relevant
to mention men – specifically men who identify as homosexual, or in other ways do not
conform to stereotypical notions of what it means to be a “man” in some societies –
because they too may be perceived as breaking religious norms, or they might have a
hard time framing their stances as political.
Recent domestic case law furthermore shows that articulating men’s experiences of
persecution as gendered may be an increasingly successful strategy. In terms of the PSG
category, “[a]n example […] is the Australian High Court decision in Applicant S. The
majority held that ‘able-bodied young men’ in Afghanistan who fear forced recruitment
by the Taliban might constitute a PSG” (Edwards, 2010: 42). Other examples of genderbased or gender-specific violence against men that may constitute persecution are
“castration, forced sterilization, military recruitment, human trafficking for prostitution or
pornography, organ removal, forced labour, or punishment for transgressing social mores
such as homosexuality” (Edwards, 2010: 41). The absence of any discussion of “men as
gender” may have the effect of establishing for the reader that gender equals women; that
for women, their gender identity is a defining, organizing and important aspect of their
identity which profoundly shapes their experiences and opportunities, whereas the same
is not thought of men, who are mainly portrayed as political or religious actors, involved
in racial or nationality based conflict, their gender left aside. For men who do experience
gender-based persecution, in turn, it might be harder to frame their claims as such.
Lastly, one could also argue that an nearly exclusive focus on women under the heading
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“gender-related claims to asylum” assumes that gender concerns have been absent in
previous readings of the law, when an alternative approach could be that a highly
politicized notion of gender has always been present. One could, for instance, argue that
the law always has been read through a gendered lens, except this lens has been malebiased, making the gender element of men’s concerns “invisible.” The ambition of a
guide to conduct gender-sensitive interpretation could, therefore, bring within its scope to
reveal how men’s claims may also be based on their experiences and persecution as male.
This section has established that the Guidelines itself struggles to find a language with
which to express gender in relation to persecution. This is seen through the attempt to
define and separate between gender-related concepts – such as “sex” and “gender,”
“gender” and “sexuality,” or “gender,” “women,” and “men” – while these distinction
break down in practice throughout the text. This failure to find an adequate vocabulary
may reflect the complexities with which we might understand the gender concept, as it
encompasses physical and social aspects, and interrelates with other categories, such as
sexual orientation. The Guidelines, however, fails to treat gender as it intersects with
concepts such as for instance sexuality. Building on this argument, I will in the next
section analyze the ways gender is further treated as separate and enclosed ground that
can be analyzed “outside” of the other definition elements, rather than in the intersection
with them.
4.C. The Relationship Between Gender and the Refugee Definition
In the following, I analyze how gender is thought to relate to the other definitional terms,
that is, the persecution concept and each of the five protected grounds of persecution. I
argue that the relationship that is portrayed is an additive one, in that gender, as well as
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the other identity categories relevant to the refugee concept, are seen as enclosed, stable
grounds, that may be added to one another in judging experiences, but that ultimately are
analyzed and conceptualized as separate entities. Within the text of the Guidelines there
is no way to think of one’s identity outside of this additive model, which disregards the
experiences that arise from the intersection of gender with other identity markers, such as
for instance race and nationality. Thus, point that gender is not experienced as stable for
everyone, and that it might not be articulated the same way for different people, is
disregarded.
Although the Guidelines establishes that the term “gender-related persecution” has “no
legal meaning per se” (article 1), the term nonetheless appears both in the title and
several times throughout the document. The question of how gender relates to, and
impacts experiences of persecution, is furthermore at the heart of any inquiry into how
the refugee definition should be understood through a gender lens. Literature on the
relationship between gender and the refugee status outline at least two different ways that
gender is thought as a relevant aspect of persecution. Or put differently, the idea that
someone can be persecuted as a woman may be understood in at least two different ways.
In short, “[t]he concept of women being persecuted as women is not the same as women
being persecuted because they are women,” writes Binder (2001: 172). Firstly, gender
may stand in a causal relation to persecution as the reason or motive for the abuse. A
person’s gender identity may the basis or cause of the persecution, in that a person is
persecuted because of her/him belonging to that gender. This is encompassed in the term
“gender-related persecution” (Binder, 2001: 173), and speaks to the motive of the
perpetrator. Secondly, the types and forms of persecution may be “gender-specific,” in
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that the violence directed at women may be of a different nature than the violence
typically inflicted on men, even in cases where the perpetrators motive for persecution is
the same. In an ethnic conflict, for instance, the men may be maimed or killed while the
women are raped, both as acts that attempt to destroy the ethnic identity and prosperity of
a racial group (Guidelines, article 24). These different ways that gender may be a
necessary element to understand the persecution are usually captured in the terms genderrelated, or gender-based, persecution and gender-specific persecution respectively.
The Guidelines, after establishing that gender-related persecution has “no legal meaning,”
does not set out to define these subtle nuances that detail how we understand persecution
as gendered. The Guidelines seems to operate with an understanding of “gender-related
persecution” as a term that encompass both meanings outlined above. In Article 6 (cited
above), for instance, the Guidelines posits that gender can “influence” or “dictate” both
“the type of persecution” and “the reasons for this treatment.” This wording seems to
encompass both of the ways gender may relate to persecution outlined above. The
language that gender can influence or dictate (also understood as to control or decisively
affect; to determine) the reason for the persecution, constructs this relationship as one in
which gender is the base that action springs out from. Throughout the document, there is
some conflation between the two ways that persecution may be gendered, and it is not
always clear why the Guidelines refers to one meaning over the other. This may, in turn,
reflect a certain lack of clarity around the terms used to describe gender, and the realities
and conditions that they describe. The conflation of the two meanings becomes
increasingly clear when looking at the relationship of gender to the five enumerated
persecution grounds.
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In terms of the nexus requirement, through which gender is tied to the ground of
persecution, the Guidelines establishes that the fear of gendered persecution must be “for
reasons of” one of the five grounds. The enumerated grounds do not have to be the sole,
or even dominant, ground, however, as long as it is a “relevant contributing factor”
(article 20). This could be interpreted as placing less emphasis on the motives of the
perpetrator, as establishing the main cause of persecution is less important. This may
facilitate the recognition of acts committed by non-state actors as persecution, as it is
harder to establish motive in cases of non-state perpetrators (Fletcher, 2006, 113). Thus,
in order to qualify for asylum a claimant must satisfy the nexus requirement by showing
that at least one of the five protected Convention grounds is a relevant contributing factor
within his or her gender-based claim. In other words, the persecution feared must be “for
reason of” race, nationality, religion, membership in a particular social group (PSG), or
political opinion. The relationship between gender and the five enumerated grounds has
therefore significant bearing on the outcomes of gender-related claims. In the following I
look closer at the relationship between gender and each of these persecution grounds.
The categories of race and nationality are discussed to a lesser degree in any of the other
protected grounds, making them appear less significant to gender-related cases. The
Guidelines notes that the nature of the persecution arising from these grounds may take
on gender-specific forms. Within the few lines written about race and gender, this
relationship is described in the following way: “[p]ersecution for reasons of race may be
expressed in different ways against men and women” (article 24). In terms of nationality,
the Guidelines asserts that: “[a]lthough persecution on the grounds of nationality (as with
race) is not specific to women or men, in many instances the nature of the persecution
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takes a gender-specific form, most commonly that of sexual violence directed against
women and girls” (article 27). In other words, the Guidelines mentions how race- and
nationality-based violence may be gender-specific, but not potentially simultaneously
gender-related or -based. When it comes to the other nexuses, in comparison, the
question of how gender may “inform” religious or political identities or constitute a PSG
is discussed for each ensuing ground respectively, whereas the nature of the categories of
race and nationality are treated more like separate, confined unities, outside that of
gender. Race and nationality may, in other words, affect what the violence “looks like,”
but no attempt is made to question how gender may be relevant in understanding race or
nationality as causes of persecution. That is, the document does not discuss how race,
ethnicity and gender may intersect and form unique identities and experiences – which in
turn may be ascribed with special social and symbolic significance in a given society, and
become the basis for persecution. To take one example, it has been noted that in the case
of the Mexico femicides –or the widespread abduction, torture and murder of Mexican
women along the Mexican border - the victims fit a certain profile: they are
predominately young, dark-skinned females (Livingston, 2004: 59). However, they are
apparently not attacked only because they have darker skin, and not only because they are
female, but because they are women with darker skin, in a society where this is attributed
particular meaning and status (Livingston, 2004: 59). Violence occurring during an ethnic
conflict can, furthermore, be both racialized and gendered insofar as both ethnic and male
superiority is established simultaneously through the use of violence. Notions of
nationhood (and race) may be inherently intertwined with concepts of masculinity and
femininity and ideas of male dominance, in such a way that aspects of gender and
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nationality may be inseparable in deciding on the cause of persecution. It can be argued
that the categories of race and nationality are left somewhat un-problematized in the
Guidelines, leaving the impression that they are somehow separable from gender identity.
Gender may, in the Guidelines, “dictate or influence” persecution in its own right, but is
not thought to intersect and inter-relate with other identity markers or aspects in
producing experiences of persecution.
In terms of religion as a ground for persecution, the guidelines note that different roles
may be assigned to men and women on religious grounds, and that women who fail to
fulfill or abide by these roles may experience persecution as a result (article 25, quoted
above). In other words, questions of how religion may intersect with gender via norms
about other identity aspects, such as sexuality, are not discussed. How norms of
masculinity and femininity are deeply intertwined with norms of sexuality and vice versa,
and how such interconnected notions may lead to the (gendered) persecution of lesbians
and homosexual men, are concerns that are left out of the Guidelines. The Guidelines
specifies that it in the case of women, is sufficient that the person is perceived to be
holding unacceptable religious beliefs, notwithstanding her actual opinions on the matter.
The Guidelines acknowledges that the boundaries between the grounds of religion and
political opinion can become blurred: “[w]hile religious tenets require certain kinds of
behaviour from a woman, contrary behaviour may be perceived as evidence of an
unacceptable political opinion” (article 6). “This is particularly true,” states the
Guidelines, “in societies where there is little separation between religious and State
institutions, laws and doctrines” (article 26). The Guidelines operates with a fairly broad
understanding of the “political,” in “there is not as such an inherently political or […]
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non-political activity;” rather, “the context of the case should determine its nature”
(article 32). The term “political opinion” should furthermore be “understood in the broad
sense, to incorporate any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of State,
government, society, or policy may be engaged” (article 32). Non-conformist behavior
may also fall under the scope of this ground, in so far as such behavior may be taken as
evidence of the person holding a political opinion. In other words, it is “the context of the
case should determine its nature [as political],” and the Guidelines specifies that opinions
on women’s rights and gender roles may be understood as such (article 32). Such open
definitions of the political create room for acts previously understood as private to be
reframed as political, which has important implications for gender-based cases. By
emphasizing context and not only State but also society in outlining the political, the
Guidelines opens for gender-based claims to be framed as political.
However, there is still a certain notion of the “political” as stable, and as inherently
gendered, at play in the Guidelines. The Guidelines state that “[t]he image of a political
refugee as someone who is fleeing persecution for his or her direct involvement in
political activity does not always correspond to the reality of the experiences of women in
some societies” (article 33). As discussed, it is interesting to note the use of gender-words
in this sentence. From the more gender-neutral inclusion of both “his or her
involvement,” the Guidelines turns to “the experiences of women in some societies.” The
text chooses to state that it is women who fall without a narrow understanding of the
political, rather than people more generally. The effect of this use of gender-words is
arguably that the relationship of men to the political is cast as typically more direct, in
that men are political in the original, “simple” sense of the word, through their “direct
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involvement in political activity,” while women’s political involvement is more indirect.
Any consideration of other identity markers that may affect the nature of one’s
involvement in the political across the groups of men and women – such as class, race,
ethnicity, or sexual orientation, for example – are effectively excluded from the sentence,
because it specifically asserts that it is “women” who deviate from the traditional
understanding of the political.
In further describing what political activity might look like, then, for women, the
Guidelines focuses on how women “are less likely than their male counterparts to engage
in high profile political activity and are more often involved in ‘low level’ political
activities that reflect dominant gender roles,” and “frequently attributed with political
opinions of their family or male relatives” (article 33). These statements seem to confirm
the notion that political activity is gendered, and that women relate to the refugee
standing largely by being mis-interpreted as harboring political opinions, or through
engaging in “low-level” activities of a more private nature, such as nursing sick rebels.
This gendered understanding of the political provides an example of how women, and
women’s activities and opinions, are privatized. There is a silence within the Guidelines
when it comes to the ways that women who work to change the society they live in, who
do participate in politics, and who actively state their (religious, feminist, political)
opinions, may experience gender-specific forms of persecution.
This omission may solidify notions that women largely relate to the refugee status
through persecution of social and cultural art, rather than political persecution in its
“original” sense. It is through their roles as community- or family members that they are
persecuted, as they are involved in nursing the males “properly” involved in political
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action; or because they are attributed with the actual political opinions of their male
family members. Or they are seen as political only insofar as they fail to conform to the
norms ascribed to their gender. Interestingly, Palmary (2008) describes the existence of
the notion that “violence against women is a form of violence different to the violence of
war, and is rather embedded in culture […]” (128). The nature of violence that affects
women is seen as different from the violence experienced by men, and it is primarily
because women violate the cultural norms that establish their “proper” place and roles in
society they are persecuted, not because they are targeted for opinions and behaviors that
in their “truest” forms are political.
Lastly, the Guidelines does not discuss the question of whether violence against women
may in itself be understood as inherently political acts. Structural violence aimed at
women who do not conform to social norms may be understood as a response to a
perceived threat to male dominance and power. The fact that violence against women is a
global phenomenon points to ways that such violence is structured. Within such a
framework, writes Edwards, acts of violence against women can be understood as
sending a particular political message: “stay in your place or be afraid” (Edwards, 2011:
318). In the U.K. context, Querton (2012) notes that “to be recognised as refugees […],
women must often demonstrate that they fear persecution on account of their membership
of a particular social group (PSG) because the proposition that any violence against
women is political has not yet, as such, found enough support” (4).
As noted by Querton (2012) and others (Edwards, 2010: 28; Neacsu, 2003: 194), PSG is
of particular significance for gender-based claims. This “make[s] a proper understanding
of this term of paramount importance” (article 28). The PSG category is furthermore
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arguably the most ambiguous of the five nexuses, and it is the ground that allows claims
where gender is the sole basis for persecution. The Guidelines define a PSG as:
a group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of
being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic
will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise
fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights (article
29).
This definition combines two distinct approaches to the PSG category, the “protected
characteristics” and the “social perception” approach (Chan: 181). The first asks whether
members of the proposed social group possess some innate, unchangeable or immutable
characteristic, whereas the social perception approach asks whether the members of the
group are perceived as a group in society (Chan, 2011: 181). The UNHCR definition
encompasses both approaches, making the PSG ground broad in scope.
However, the PSG category is limited in that “the interpretation of this ground cannot
render the other four Convention grounds superfluous” (article 28). In other words,
categories such as race, nationality, and religion must fall outside of the concept of PSG
as properly understood. “Sex,” on the other hand “can properly be within the ambit of the
social group category, with women being a clear example of a social subset defined by
innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently treated differently than
men” (Article 30). There is a certain tension between these two decisions. Whether there
is some innate difference that makes a category based on sex or gender fall within the
ambit of a particular social group, whereas one based on race or nationality does not, is
left unaddressed. The Guidelines offers little justification why it reaches this conclusion
at all, merely stating that “in some cases, the emphasis given to the social group ground
has meant that other applicable grounds have been over-looked” and that therefore, “the
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interpretation given to this ground cannot render the other four Convention grounds
superfluous” (article 28).
Again, it is interesting to note that the word used to describe the PSG here is “sex,” not
“gender.” This choice might mirror an inherent conflation of the two terms within the
document. Alternatively, the biological “sex” may consciously be used to invoke the
physical aspects of gender as opposed to relational roles and identities. When the
Guidelines jumps from “sex” to “women” in this way, it might be reasonable to think of
“women” here understood in the more biological sense. The emphasis on biological traits
might reflect that they are more easily defendable as “innate and immutable”
characteristics, which the claimant is unable to change. When it comes to gender-related
claims of persecution based on (resisting) proscribed roles and responsibilities, it might
be more complicated to establish that the claimant’s refusal to conform is “fundamental
to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.” This problematic can be
illustrated by the case of Fatin v. I.N.S. in which an Iranian woman claimed a fear of
persecution partly based on her political opinions as a feminist. Her case was rejected, in
part because she failed to establish that her “opinion on women’s rights was not
sufficiently fundamental to her personal beliefs so as to cause [her] to continue her
advocacy in Iran,” which in turn would mean that she would not raise herself to the
attention of Iranian authorities (Chan, 2011: 182). She was for instance asked whether
she would agree, after all, to wear the veil upon having to return to Iran.
There are, however, certain differences between a PSG based on sex, and the grounds of
race or nationality as freestanding nexuses. One example of this is that the “name” of the
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category would not be “gender” but “women.” It is noteworthy that the Guidelines does
not argue or mention that “men” can constitute a PSG. If case law should frequently
define “women” as a PSG that may be the ground of persecution, while “men” is not
treated in the same manner, this may have the effect of victimizing women, treating the
gender-identity of “women” as a uniform category, identifiable by the members’ inherent
status as oppressed. Men are not grouped together in this way, but rather diversely
constructed as political or religious actors, or as persecuted because of their race or
nationality. Men are, in other words, primarily recognized as persons or individuals, not
as members of a uniform, subordinate group. Naming the category “women” and not
“gender” may also reiterate an image that it is men who are the perpetrators (actors),
while women are the victims (acted-upon). In addition to excluding cases where men may
in fact be victims of gender-based persecution, this might furthermore have the effect of
silencing the differences in power and status within the group of “women” in a given
society. The fact that gender is not the only defining characteristic in women’s lives, but
rather intersects with a multitude of other identity-markers, such as class or race, is
downplayed within this construction of women as a stable ground. This ignores the ways
that women may also be the perpetrators of persecution against other women.
In this section I have looked closer at how the Guidelines constructs the relationships
between gender and the various elements of the refugee definition. I have argued that this
relationship is based on additive principles, where each of the categories is seen as
enclosed unites that the law may address and analyze separately and as clearly distinct
from each other. Sexuality and gender are treated separately, for instance, and not as
inherently intertwined concepts. The absence of any discussion of how other aspects of
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identity, such as race, nationality, sexuality, and class may intersect with gender in
forming experiences of persecution, leads to the construction of a legal subject that is
seen as stable, fixed and separate from her culture, history, and community. The group of
“women” is arguably pitted against that of “men,” disregarding how individuals within
such group may partake in the persecution of each other, for instance on the basis of
sexuality or race. The question of how gender may relate to persecution is problematic
within the Guidelines because the document fails to separate between gender-specific and
gender-related persecution. Gender may be a ground that persecution emerges from in its
own right – as such recognized within law as constituting a PSG – but in terms of race
and nationality, gender can, within the Guidelines, only influence the form of the
violence. This reflects an additive approach to identity categories, in which the
Guidelines struggles to articulate the ways that gender may intersect with such categories,
which, similarly to gender, are constructed as enclosed, and separate grounds.
4.D. Concluding Remarks
In reading the Guidelines closely to uncover the relationship between gender and the
refugee concept, I have broken the refugee definition down to its smaller elements, and
investigated both how gender is constructed in relation to the persecution concept, and
each of the five enumerated grounds that make up the nexus requirement. I argue that
gender is treated as a ground that may influence, or dictate, violence, while existing as a
confined entity, clearly separate from the other elements of the refugee definition. I
assert, however, that the Guidelines contain a performative contradiction, in that the
language implemented to describe and define gender is unable to construct gender in this
way. Rather, the meaning and content of gender-related terms are conflated, altered, and
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confused throughout the text. Clear definitions of and distinctions between concepts
break down throughout the publication. Thus, I assert that the struggle within the
Guidelines to pin down the words with which to express gender betrays the way that
gender is in fact not stable, confined and easily recognized as separable from other
identity markers. Rather, feminist insight argues that gender is context-bound and
flexible, understood and experienced in a myriad of ways. Olivius, for instance, writes
that “gender is a social construction emerging from particular geographic and historical
contexts, and as such, fluid and contingent rather than signifying two stable categories of
subjects” (2010: 4-5). In her work, gender is defined as the “stories that have been told
about ‘men’ and ‘women’” (Olivius, 5). Judith Butler, on her part, argues that there is not
one essential female identity that can be represented, whether within law or elsewhere.
She holds that gender identity is performative; it is posited through our actions, rather
than something we begin with as an essential ground for identity. Or in her words: “what
we take to be an internal essense of gender is manufactured trough a sustained set of acts,
posited through the gendered stylization of the body” (1999: xv). This thesis argues that
the Guidelines offers a definition of gender identity that lacks and understanding of
gender as intersectional with other aspects of identity, and as inherently bound up in a
multitude of meanings, contexts, and symbolisms.
These points made in the analysis section have relevance for what it means for an
individual to be “read” by the law; how one makes a claim that are recognizable within
legal contexts. As the analysis and literature review has illustrated, the question of
appearing before the law can be recast as a question of language, and the terms with
which we may “speak” ourselves to the law, and how, in turn, those terms are interpreted.
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As we have seen, this is furthermore a particularly problematic process for women,
because they have to assert their claims within a male-biased interpretive framework,
which lacks the words to express gender-related experiences. The Guidelines too
struggles to pin down terms that describes gender in relation to law and the refugee
status. In the following chapter, then, I turn to this question of what interpretations of
gender as a category means for how women are read by the law “on the ground.” In the
concluding discussion, I therefore investigate trends within case law in order to better
understand the implications of the arguments asserted in the analysis. I argue that the
interpretive nature of (refugee) law both posits barriers form women claimants, in
producing case law that is unpredictable and irregular, while also creating opportunities
for claimants and advocates to discursively challenge and develop notions of gender
within law. Drawing on the notion of human rights as narrative constructions, I argue that
an investigation of the discourse of human rights institutions is of crucial importance in
order to promote equality within human rights law.

87
Chapter Five - Conclusion

Gendered Claims to Asylum: Issues and Possibilities
In doing a close reading of the UNHCR Gender Guidelines, I have argued that the
publication contains a performative contradiction. On one hand I assert that gender is
treated as an enclosed and separate category that exists outside of other aspects of
identity, particularly in the case of race and nationality. As such, the Guidelines lacks a
sense of intersectionality in its treatment of gender, as gender is not analyzed at the places
where it intersects with other aspects of identity, such as sexuality, race, or nationality.
This leads to the construction of a human rights subject whose identity is fixed and stable.
The contradiction contained in the Guidelines arises from the way that the language the
document itself uses to describe gender betrays the way that gender is a complex and
interrelated part of identity, bound up in socially and culturally specific meanings. That
is, while the Guidelines treats gender as stable, fixed, and enclosed, the text is unable to
pin down a language, or a vocabulary, that expresses gender in such a way. Rather, the
way that words and their meanings are conflated throughout the text reveals how gender
is a complex concept, encompassing a variety of lived experiences and culturally and
temporally specific meanings.
The argument formulated in the previous chapter points, however, to a question of what
this performative contradiction within the Guidelines means for asylum seekers in
particular – and of the significance of language for those studying human rights in
general. Thus, the discussion conducted in this concluding chapter is devoted to a
question about the relationship between language on the one hand, and the field of human
rights, and the various lived experiences of people “on the ground,” on the other. In the
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following, I look closer at what it means to make a claim to the refugee status in terms of
gender – how people may articulate their claims in order to make their gendered
experiences and identities intelligible to law – in light of guidelines and publications that
themselves conflates various lived experiences and meanings.
Firstly, investigating case law in which gender is a component, I demonstrate the struggle
of taking up a place within refugee law in terms of gender. Despite the existence of UN
guidelines and scholarly literature on how to conduct gender sensitive readings of the
refugee Convention, inconsistency, irregularity and a sense of arbitrariness persists within
case law, as gender is read and interpreted differently from court to court. That is, the
ambiguity of the gender concept and related terms create much leeway for states, courts,
and judges to apply differing and arbitrary readings of the law. The considerable room
that a ambiguous gender concept leaves for interpretation is significant, I argue, because
in order to be “heard” by the law, women claimants in particular have to navigate
different “scripts” through which to narrate their experiences of persecution, depending
on the various courts’ understanding of gender. I thus argue that those fleeing genderrelated persecution lack a place in a double sense; both in terms of having left one’s
country, and in lacking a grammatical “space” within refugee law.
Secondly, and despite the challenges outlined above, I also argue that the very
irregularity with which courts apply and interpret refugee guidelines and law in fact
create room for resistance. That is, precisely because human rights and law are
disciplines where language, narration, definition, and interpretation are central
components, individual cases represent a space, or a moment, in which people may
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challenge and develop understandings of gender within refugee law. Claimants and
advocates have some room in compelling courts to recognize intersectionality, for
instance, when it is not contained within human rights guidelines and instruments.
Finally, drawing on the notion that power operates through language and interpretation, I
outline some practical implications for those seeking to advance gender equality within
international refugee law. Using the insight of Slaughter (1997) and Shaffer and Smith
(2004) that human rights can be productively understood in terms of narration and
narrative voices, I argue that studies of language and discourse are crucial in uncovering
the ability of different social groups to narrate their experiences of persecution to and
within the law. When understanding human rights in terms of narratives and voices,
having a claim to the law or a voice as a legal subject means that one is able to narrate
one’s experiences and identity in ways that are recognizable in and to law. Understanding
the vocabulary available to refugees is therefore crucial in order to work for just
recognition before the law. I ultimately argue that the solution to creating a more genderinclusive refugee law does not lie in merely changing the words, terms, or language of
refugee laws and instruments, because language may always be interpreted in ways that
privileges certain perspectives and excludes others. Rather, the question of gender
equality within refugee protection is multi-faceted and complex, and requires crossdisciplinary approach that simultaneously analyzes, challenges, and develops language
used to express gender; reads for the power embedded in the process of interpreting the
language of laws; works for greater consistency, transparency, and accountability
throughout this process; and strives for more equitable representation within institutions,
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in terms of a greater gender-balance within human rights organizations and domestic
juridical structures.
5.A. Case Law
In doing a close reading of the Guidelines I have outlined the ways that gender is
understood and constructed as a concept. In this section, I take a closer look at the more
practical implications of how the concept of gender is interpreted, and at the question of
what it means to make a claim to the law in terms of gender. I focus, first, on cases in
which gender has been relevant in formulating a particular social group (PSG), in order to
address how gender is constituted in and through the PSG category. I choose to look at
the relationship between gender and the PSG concept because gender arguably comes
closest to constituting a separate nexus when it is formulated as a basis for a particular
social group, and as such, it is the PSG ground that provides the framework for cases
where gender is framed as the sole ground for persecution. The PSG ground is
increasingly becoming the default way to treat women claimants (Edwards, 2010: 28),
and because a large part of gender-related claims are likely to be treated in relation to the
PSG category, it is particularly important to look how this relation is understood within
case law. I also address trends in decision-making in cases of domestic abuse and female
genital cutting, in order to demonstrate that whether violence against women is
interpreted as a human rights violation depends on gendered and racialized readings of
the law.
In order to look at some trends in decision making invoking the particular social group
(PSG) ground, I have chosen the cases of “Immigration Appeal Tribunal and another,
exparte Shah; Islam and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department” (hereafter
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Shah and Islam), and “In Re R-A.-“ (hereafter R-A-), as these have been ground-breaking
cases in the U.K. and U.S. context respectively. In Shah and Islam, the UK House of
Lords granted asylum in 1999 to two Pakistani women fleeing severe domestic abuse
were granted asylum in the U.K., based on their membership in a PSG consisting of
“Pakistani women.” In the case of R-A-, Rodi Alvarado fought for asylum in the U.S.
over the course of many years, after fleeing from a husband who beat and raped her on a
regular basis. Ultimately, Alvarado “received asylum in a non-precedential decision
based on her membership in the particular social group of ‘married women in Guatemala
who are unable to leave the relationship’” (Lobo: 2013: 376). In accepting the broad
category of “Pakistani women” as constituting a PSG, Shah and Islam set precedent in
allowing for the broad category of “women” in a society to be recognized as a PSG, is in
line with the reasoning of the UNHCR Guidelines. Several similar cases have been
approved in the time since (Lobo, 2013: 374). This broad approach to gender and the
PSG nexus stands in contrast to the more narrow “gender-plus” approach, in which a
PSG should be defined by gender plus some other limiting characteristics, “such as
beliefs, relationships to the persecutor, or attempted escape” (Fletcher, 2006: 118). The
PSG articulated in the U.S. case of R-A- , for example, reads as “married women in
Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship.” When it comes to U.S. case law
generally, courts and decision-makers have been hesitant to articulate social groups based
on “women” in a given society without any additional qualifiers (Lobo, 2013: 368),
making the “gender-plus” approach a strategy more likely to succeed in U.S. courts
(Fletcher, 2006: 118). Depending on the court in which a claimant seeks asylum, then, the
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claimant must articulate her gender identity, and the way that her gender was a
contributing reason for the persecution, in different ways in order to be successful.
This difference in terms of how gender is thought to constitute a PSG has implications for
women claimants, because they run into different challenges depending on the approach
taken in each specific court. The approach of accepting “women” in a society as a PSG
may be beneficial to women claimants in that it highlights the ways violence against
women tends to be the structural and interconnected with other forms of harm, which
facilitates a more holistic consideration of gender-related and gender-specific claims
(Lobo, 2013: 404). However, this approach has also been interpreted in ways that places
additional burden upon women claimants. Lobo (2013) describes a development where
courts do not merely accept that the claimant establishes her own fear of persecution in
the context of inadequate state protection, but also require her to establish that the same is
true for the larger social group of “women” in a specific society, whom she claims her
persecution is grounded in (373). A woman must, in other words, both establish
discrimination against herself and against the social group of women in her society,
whereas “applicants claiming racial or religious persecution (for instance) need only
show an individualized well-founded fear of persecution, not harm to their entire group”
(Lobo, 2013: 373). The interpretation of “women” as a PSG, then, may lead courts to
subject women to a double burden of proof because they are required to demonstrate two
failures of state protection, both in protecting her and the women in her society at large
(2013: 373). In the 2003 case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v. ZH, for
example, an Iranian woman fled to the U.K. after having suffered domestic violence, and
even though the court did find that Iranian women are discriminated against “in their
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personal status” (para. 75), they rejected that “Iranian women” were persecuted as a
group, as they were treated better than the group of “Pakistani women” relevant in the
Shah and Islam case (para. 79-80). This demonstrates that even where case law and
practice is in agreement with the general provisions of the Guidelines, the application of
“women” as a PSG could lead to women being read by the law primarily as group
members, whose refugee status is dependent on the situation of her social group, rather
than her individual situation.
As opposed to framing “women” as a PSG, a gender-plus approach rather singles out one
specific manifestation of women’s subordination, and treats it in isolation. While this
approach may read women more like individuals than group members, it may also negate
the structural and interconnected nature of gendered violence, as applicants are forced to
articulate their experiences on a case-by-case basis (Lobo, 2013: 378). Because the
structural nature of violence against women is lost when a “new” and specific PSG is
formulated in each case, individuals may struggle to have their experiences recognized as
persecution and as human rights violations. In the words of Lobo: “[s]ince adjudicators
are less likely to grant asylum claims based on isolated harms, non-recognition of women
as a particular social group inhibits the Convention’s mandate to protect victims of
gender persecution” (2013: 368). The articulation of a new PSG in each case furthermore
leaves little room for any stable guidelines outlining the concrete definition of what an
accepted PSG looks like. In analyzing of over 206 outcomes in domestic violence cases
in the U.S., Blaine Bookey finds “contradictory and arbitrary outcomes” in how the PSG
concept is interpreted and applied, despite a development towards somewhat greater
consistency (2013: 147). The study illustrates this point by comparing two seemingly
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similar domestic violence cases, in which “judges agreed that the women testified
credibly, that the harm they suffered rose to the level of persecution, and that their
governments had failed to protect them” (Bookey, 2013: 108). Yet, in one case asylum
was granted on the grounds of membership in the particular social group of “Salvadorian
women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave,” (Bookey, 2013: 108) whereas
courts decided in the second case that “a group defined by gender, nationality, and status
in a domestic relationship is not cognizable under the law” (108). Based on this
irregularity, Bookey argues that “the absence of binding norms remains a major
impediment to fair and consistent outcomes for women who fear return to countries
where they confront unimaginable harms, or worse, death” (2013: 110).
When it comes to violence against women as human rights violation, further
inconsistency exists, depending on different courts’ interpretation of gender and race.
In comparing 645 Canadian asylum cases involving domestic violence, forced
sterilization, and female genital cutting (FGC), Efrat Arbel (2013) finds that adjudicators
are consistent in identifying FGC and forced sterilization as rights violations, and the
women subjected to such practices as a victim of a persecutory practice (2013: 731-732).
On the other hand, domestic abuse is seldom seen as rights violations in itself, and
claimants in such cases rarely understood as a victims of human rights violations. “That
is,” argues Arbel, “adjudicators generally recognized domestic violence claimants as
refugees not because they were victims of persecutory practices but because they were
victims of persecutory cultures,” (2013: 732). In other words, they are rather seen as
victims of their own, discriminatory cultures, rather than structural human rights abuse.
Arbel further hypothesizes that this both stems from and reflects what he calls “a
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defensive anxiety” (2013: 732), in that practices such as FGC and forced sterilization are
seen as “exotic” in the Canadian context – and therefore easier to acknowledge as human
rights violations. Domestic violence, on the other hand, is common in Canada and
therefore a more familiar form of violence, which makes it more problematic to label it as
a rights violation, as that would be synonymous with acknowledging that human rights
abuses also take place in the Canadian context. Domestic violence might in other words
be more easily accepted as manifestations of the systematic subordination of women
when it happens “over there,” and therefore because of some cultural difference. This
entails specific notions about gender, culture, and about what it means to be a “woman”
in specific contexts. The approach taken in Canadian courts, argues Arbel, constructs
non-western culture “as a place where domestic violence occurs because of the so-called
‘inherent’ vulnerability of the women located in that cultural milieu” (732). Thus, women
fleeing from FGC may successfully frame their experiences as human rights violations,
whereas women suffering domestic abuse are more likely to succeed if formulating their
claims in terms of their inherent vulnerability and cultural subordination. This, in turn,
“erects legal and conceptual barriers for women who cannot authentically narrate their
experience through the script of cultural vulnerability or who cannot present as ‘victims
of culture’” (729).
Similarly to the point made by Arbel, Fletcher (2006) argues that adjudicators in the U.S.
context hesitate to grant refugee status in cases where the gender-related violence is
similar to forms of violence that are familiar. Or put another way, because of “racial and
gender stereotypes,” adjudicators more readily accept gender-related claims based on
practices that appear “foreign” or non-Western (Fletcher, 2006: 118), such as FGC or
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forced sterilization. There might be a parallel here to the point made earlier in this paper,
that scholars find that adjudicators are more prone to accept arguments based on
women’s physical vulnerability – as in the case of FGC – than claims based on their
active resistance to prescribed roles and restraints (Fitzpatrick, 1997: 44).
What this overview of some trends and tendencies within case law illustrates, then, is the
difficulties women claimants face in articulating their experiences of gender-based
persecution within refugee law. The lack of a coherent and binding norms mean that
outcomes are inconsistent, and heavily reliant on individual courts and judges. Women
claimants, in particular, have to manage different scripts, or narratives, in asserting their
claims – they have to represent themselves and their experiences in and through specific
terms and vocabularies – depending on the context they apply within. Such legal and
conceptual barriers imply that individuals fleeing from gender-related persecution can be
seen as lacking a place in a dual sense; both in having to leave their home country, and in
lacking a grammatical space within law, not having a vocabulary with and through which
to narrate their experiences and identities in a way that is recognized by law. The fact that
approaches to, and interpretations of, gender differ from nation to nation, demonstrates
the power each state has to interpret the relationship between gender and the refugee
standing. This point demonstrates the continued significance of the first exigency
outlined in the introduction, as individual states and courts retain autonomy in applying
specific interpretation of international law.
However, this discrepancy between refugee instruments and law, on the one hand, and
case law on the other, also demonstrates that there is considerable room in individual
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cases to challenge dominant interpretations of gender within refugee law. Precisely
because the gender concept is ambiguous, claimants and advocates may construct new
and progressive formulations of the relationship between gender and the refugee
definition. Additionally, the question of how gender relates to the refugee concept is part
of an ongoing discussion, and scholars and practitioners continue to monitor and
challenge decision made in court. This means that individuals have room to contribute to
a more nuanced understanding of gender within refugee law – one that recognized
intersectionality, for instance.
5.B. Concluding Remarks: Human Rights as Narratives
In the ensuing discussion, I build on this argument by looking at the benefits of viewing
human rights in terms of narratives and narrative voices. Throughout this paper, focus has
been on language as a tool of power and the ways that language and discourse has
historically worked to exclude certain social groups from the protection of human rights
instruments. I have, for instance, reviewed literature arguing that the exclusion of
women’s experiences stems from the ways the language of the refugee Convention has
been interpreted from a male (and heteronormative) perspective. I have analyzed
UNHCR’s own guidelines on how to conduct gender-inclusive readings of the law,
arguing that even the Guidelines falters in establishing the words to accurately represent
and express gender-experiences and identities, and ultimately treats gender as a stable, or
fixed ground. Overviewing case law has worked to demonstrate the challenges facing
those asserting gender-related claims to asylum, in which the lack of clarity around
concepts such as “gender” and “particular social group” leaves much leeway for courts to
apply limited understandings of gender-related violence and persecution. What this last
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section does, then, is to turn to the notion that human rights can be recast as personal
narration and narrative voices; that “human rights function as narrative constructions”
(Slaughter, 1997: 407). I assert that the focus on voice and narration within human rights
law points to issues of representation, that is, of who decides and delineates what
vocabulary is recognized within law. Substituting one gender-word for another is not
likely to have a great impact as long as the people reading and interpreting the terms
remain the same. Women’s rights activists and scholars of international studies should,
therefore, take a multifaceted, cross-disciplinary approach, in order to work for a more
equitable representation of women and minorities within human rights instruments.
As I have argued throughout this thesis, language and the personal narrative have a
central place within human rights law. After all, in order to access the refugee status and
be recognized by the law, an individual must articulate her experiences of persecution as
they are shaped by her identity and circumstances. Shaffer and Smith argue that the life
narrative is not only a key component within law, but has become “one of the most potent
vehicles” for advancing claims within the human rights regime in general (2004: 1). The
norms, instruments, and discourses of human rights, argue Shaffer and Smith, are indeed
dependent upon an “international commitment to narratability” (3); human rights law is
committed “to the voice, as the tool to guarantee recourse to individual narration,” in the
words of Slaughter (1997: 429). The voice, the ability to articulate and narrate one’s
experiences and identity, becomes the core of human rights protection – a system which
is activated when individuals “[tell] their stories to human rights advocates working for
NGOs, [testify] before national inquiries and official or quasi-official tribunals, and
[present] their stories to the court of world opinion” (Shaffer and Smith, 2004: 3). It is
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such testimony, such personal narratives, that “brings into play, implicitly or explicitly, a
rights claim” (Shaffer and Smith, 2004: 3). Thus, Slaughter asserts the human rights
regime is committed to protecting the voice of a presumed self-narrating subject and its
ability to articulate narratives of identity (1997).
In this sense, human rights violations can be understood as attacks on the human voice –
as attempts to silence the individual. Slaughter gives the example of torture, which can be
recast as an attempt to silence, or distort, the voice of the victim, in forcing her to admit
to lies, while taking away her ability to coherently narrate her story or identity. By
forcing the tortured to speak, and to make irrational statements, the torture also becomes
a language in itself, in that the act “produces a voice that makes claims about the power
of the torturer and the torturing state” (Slaughter, 1997: 427). The colonization project of
Western states can similarly be understood in terms of attempting to destroy the voice of
a people, and the socio-cultural context that enables their narratives. People were
deprived of the right to articulate the story about their own identity and history, as it was
replaced by the voice and perspective of the colonizing hegemon: “[t]he destruction of
the voice that finds itself and speaks itself, the voice that offers the counter-narrative of
the ‘Third World’ subject, is precisely the homogenizing project of colonialism”
(Slaughter, 1997: 419).
The benefits of a human rights concept that focuses on the “the voice of the juridical
subject and the possibility of narration,” argues Slaughter, is that it “allows for a
conception of human rights that does not rely upon some essential, inherent human
quality” (1997: 412). Rather, the focus on narration allows for a more flexible and fluid
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notion of human rights, in which the terms of narration are temporally and culturally
specific and adaptable to the changing contexts of different lived experiences. Thus,
argues Slaughter, “as conceptions of the speaking subject change, whether over time or
across cultures, so too must conceptions of human rights that guarantee the subject’s
ability to narrate herself” (1997: 412). Put differently, an inquiry into various conceptions
of the speaking subject and her conditions is necessary in order to judge, or evaluate,
human rights responses implemented to protect her voice. In Slaughter’s words, “as we
better understand what a subject needs to be able to tell her story, we can evaluate
entitlements and prohibitions for their effectiveness in guaranteeing the ability to selfnarrate” (1997: 430).
Along the lines of such a project that investigates “what the subject needs to tell her
story,” I have argued that an inquiry into the discourse of human right laws, and the terms
with which refugees may articulate gender-related claims, is of major importance in
working for a more equitable refugee protection regime. The analysis conducted in this
thesis seeks to contribute to such a discussion of the terms and conditions with which one
may narrate experiences of persecution in terms of gender, and have one’s claim be
recognized by law. I have argued that refugees fleeing gender-related persecution find
themselves in a situation of lacking a place in a double sense, both in having fled their
home country, and in lacking a grammatical space within refugee law where gender is
recognized in a coherent and predictable way. Grounding my research in literature on the
ways language and interpretation has worked to exclude women’s experiences from the
protection of refugee law, I have argued that also the UNHCR Guidelines fails to provide
an accurate vocabulary with which to articulate gender within law. Using case law, I have
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illustrated that women claimants in particular have to navigate different “scripts” – that
is, different vocabularies with and through which they cast and represent their identities
and experiences in terms of gender. This because courts recognize certain narratives
while rejecting others, depending on how concepts such as gender, race, and PSGs are
constructed and interpreted. As case law illustrates, certain courts and judges enable the
narrative of the victimized woman, for instance, oppressed by her culture and inherent
weakness, while others recognize the articulation of violence against women as a
structural form of human rights violation.
Based on the inquiry conducted in this thesis, then, I argue that in order to advance
gender equality within refugee law, it is important to take a broad, cross-disciplinary
approach. That is, barriers to the equal inclusion and protection of different social groups
are rooted in various fields such as law, linguistics, politics, and human rights theory,
amongst others. A comprehensive approach should focus on the conditions for people to
narrate their experiences in terms of gender, and how such narratives are received within
law. Firstly, analyzing the discourse and language of law and human rights institutions
should remain an important practice for feminists and scholars of international relations.
Continued attention should be paid to the ways international rights discourse enables and
limits narratives of gendered persecution. Secondly, the close reading of the Guidelines
has demonstrated that in reading internationally applicable definitions, laws, and
recommendations, states and courts retain freedom and power in interpreting these
formulations. This points back to the theoretical fundament of close reading, that
language and reading are inherently social, and power-laden, activities. Given the
impossibility of pinning down the language of gender to mean one thing within law, and
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the room always left to interpretation, the position taken in this thesis is that it is not
sufficient to substitute existing language with other terms and words in order to rectify
the exclusion of women’s point of view. Rather, scholars and practitioners should work
for systematic ways to read for power and bias in the implementation of law, and to
achieve transparency and accountability in this process, in order to develop a more
coherent and equitable refugee law. Enabling practitioners to better read, and therefore
challenge, how gender is constructed in law, would also allow them to formulate
arguments that may expand and contest dominant understandings of gender. This would
in turn make law more adaptable to the particularity and context-bound nature of genderrelated cases. Thirdly, reframing of human rights as narratives compels us to recognize
not only the words available tell such narratives, but also who is able to interpret and
judge such narratives. In the words of Slaughter, “[t]he right to narration is not merely the
right to tell one’s story, it is the right to control representation” (430). Considering the
power embedded in reading and interpreting language, I therefore argue that a holistic
approach – that is, an approach that takes a cross-sisciplinary blabla, eller, that considers
the ways exclusion of gender/women happen on multiple levels, in and through multiple
interconnected fileds – also address the unequal representation of women within legal and
human rights institutions. It is important to recognize the considerable power embedded
in holding such positions, and steps should be taken in achieving a more equitable gender
balance, both within human rights institutions, and within domestic legal structures.
What this thesis demonstrates is that inquiry into legal language is inherently tied to
questions of interpretation and of who interprets, as well as about the institutional
structure such interpretation happens within. This implies that the two different feminist
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approaches to how we can include gender within refugee law – via gender-sensitive
interpretation versus textual modification of the refugee definition – may not be as
different as they might appear. What both of the sides teaches us is that the act of reading
law, in terms of interpretation and application, should be watched closely, in order to
uncover the ways such readings are in fact engaging in discursive constructions of
categories such as gender. The case of international refugee law points our attention to
the importance of having a conversation not only about how a text might be read, but also
about who is able to interpret, and how the acts of reading or interpretation can never be
“divorced” from the interpreter and the context he or she is acting within. For scholars
interested in gender equality and international law, this demonstrates that we should not
only ask the question of whether or how to formally include women within the scope of
policy and law – we should also engage in debate on what such inclusion should look
like, what it means for women to participate or be included on equal footing with men,
and, most importantly, in what language and terms such inclusion might appear.
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